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Introduction
In the international system, ISIS and Hezbollah are non-state actors involved in the power struggle
characterizing  the  Middle  East.  These  groups  developed  their  apparatuses  differently,  and they
found themselves opposed in the Syrian Civil War since 2011. Although they are different by virtue
of  their  confessional  identity,  they  share  multiple  similarities.  Both  are  the  product  of  the
international  intervention  respectively  in  Iraq/Syria  and  Lebanon;  both  share,  until  recently,  a
powerful military apparatus as well as a functional organizational system allowing them to build a
power base in the territories they control; both are recognised as terrorist or criminal organization
by part of the international community. They share another characteristic too: the pursuit of the
Islamic State, a utopia rooted in the teachings of the  Qu’ran  and Mohammad that calls  for the
demise  of  the  Western-type  of  state  in  the  Middle  East.  Although  they  are  committed  to  its
achievement, their ideals of Islamic State are essentially different, and different are their historical
and political contexts as well as their ideological motivations. One group has declared the Islamic
State whereas the other has not. Given this interesting variation, this work aims to unravel what
reasons and conditions lead to self-determination.
Under what conditions do non-state armed groups claim territorial sovereignty?
In this context, ISIS and Hezbollah are two main cases subjected to deep analysis to answer
this  question.  First  of  all,  building on the concept  of rebel  governance I  display how the self-
determination can be favoured by multiple conditions. Whereas the non-state actor exerts its power
supplanting the legitimate state and gaining recognition, I argue that rebel’s strategies are affected
respectively by the place and time-frame but mostly by the group’s relationship with the population,
other  armed  groups,  and  the  international  community.  These  conditions  are  preparatory  to
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comprehend  the  reasons  for  claiming  or  avoiding  self-determination.  However,  I  claim  that
ideology is the building block of the rebel’s approach. Whether extremist or not, ideology is the
glue  around  which  non-state  actors  cement  their  agendas.  I  argue  that  historical  and  political
developments have structured the actors’ ideologies which in turn have affected their approaches
when  dealing  with  the  above-mentioned  conditions. Following  a  certain  historical  path,  the
ideological formation of the NSAGs always ends up affecting their strategies and consequently the
self-determination  claim.  The  difference  in  the  outputs  then  lies  in  the  ideological  and  socio-
political divide between ISIS and Hezbollah. The contrasting developments of these groups, which
replied differently to national and international menaces, and their different regional priorities, as
well as their distant ideas of Islamic State, allow us to understand what led to the creation of the
“Islamic  State  of  Iraq  and  Syria”  and the  “Party  of  God”.  Inter  alia,  how the  refusal  of  any
compromise and the creation of a new Sunni identity rejecting the nation-state favoured the self-
determination, whereas the entry into politics to gain resilience from a  plethora of confessional
realities has suggested the suspension of the Islamic State.
With these considerations in mind, this introduction is structured in four parts: first, it discusses
the debates on the interaction with the state and the strategies of survival of NSAGs. Second, it
expands and clarifies the argument, third, it  explains the methodology adopted to construct this
argument. Finally, it outlines the organization of the contents. 
Non-State Armed Groups and the Question of Self-Determination
There is a prolific literature on non-state actors. However, only a few scholars explored the reasons
for  gaining  international  legal  personality  or  achieving  the  self-determination.  Whereas  many
articles  treated  non-state  actors  as  capable  of  affecting  the  international  community,  less  have
unravelled this interaction and the effects that the group’s actions have on international law as well
as  countries’  agendas.  Moreover,  given  their  floating  condition  between  recognised  and
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unrecognised entities, the study of these groups has been questioned several times: should we put
non-state actors and recognised states on the same level?  
Regarding how to treat non-state entities, the common frame of reference is to be found in
Worster’s  (2016) functionalist analysis, that assesses if a non-state actor can enjoy international
legal personality or the capacity for international rights and obligations. However, the main problem
is that, apart from the states, it is not easy to find a law capable of identifying international legal
personality (Portmann in Worster 2016: 207-208). That is why the State, as the original legal entity,
has the discretion to recognise the non-state actor. The state, or the international community, serves
as  a  guardian  of  the  international  legal  order  by  admitting  international  personality  for  new
participants (Ibid.: 3). The same argument is sustained by Ker-Lindsay (2017) who debated about
the constitutive school of thought in international law, which claims that recognition is the main
character  of statehood.  Entities aiming for international  personality  cannot  exist  if  they are not
recognized by peers (Ker-Lindsay 2017:  3). In line with this statement is Lynch (2002), who argued
that  the  non-state  entity  becomes  a  legal  person  in  international  law only  when  it  intertwines
relationships with other peer states (Lynch 2002: 837). For Nina Caspersen and Gareth Stanfield
(2011:  130),  external  recognition  constitutes  external  sovereignty  by  states  that  are  legitimate
international entities. Oppositely, many scholars abiding by the declaratory school of thought such
as Chen (1951) saw statehood as independent from recognition. The non-state actor becomes a state
when it is able to control the population, exert governance practices and having the capacity of
conducting  or  affecting  international  relations.  In  this  context,  as  international  lawyers  sustain,
when actors meet the condition for statehood we should not even refer to these entities as “non-
state” (Ker-Lindsay 2017: 4). This opposition presents how the field of inquiry concerning non-state
actors is relatively new and unstructured. However, given the international community’s power to
grant international legal personality according to different criteria, it seems important to abide by
this position to demonstrate how ISIS and Hezbollah considered the international role and decided
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to  challenge  or  align  with  it.  This  is  reinforced by the fact  that  the  constitutive theory gained
attention after the decolonization processes and the end of Soviet Union (Ibid.: 3).
Besides the literature on self-determination, a different angle which helps clarify the interaction
between NSAGs and states is referred to as rebel governance. Rebel governance has been described
as “guerilla governance” and “counterstate” respectively by Vega (1969) and Wickham-Crowley
(1987), whereas other scholars such as Kasfir (2002; 2005) emphasised on how non-state actors
make  use  of  their  political  bodies  and  form  consultative  structures  to  administrate  and  rule.
Mampilly  (2011)  focused  on  the  factors  affecting  the  rebel’s  decisions  to  offer  and  distribute
welfare services to  the population,  such as their  organizational  structure,  the domestic-coalition
building and the penetration of the state into the society.  Moreover, the burden and the influence of
rebel’s ideology is a common theme recurring in different works. Keister and Slantchev (2014) have
incorporated the role of ideology as pivotal to structuring governance strategies, whereas Arjona,
Kasfir,  and  Mampilly  (2015)  talked  about  how  symbolic  processes  affect  the  entity  in  its
relationship with the contested state, the population, and the international community. One thing is
clear,  that  rebel  governance  occurs  when a  group manages  to  administrate  both  territories  and
populations under its control. A point further sustained by Martinez and Eng (2018) in their study
about  the Syrian state  counter-action against rebels:  the organization of people through welfare
provision is one of the main features of rebel governance. Despite the amount of disposable data
about rebels, there is still a lack of knowledge about how their strategies can affect or improve their
position within the international scenario. That is why my research frames itself in this missing link
between  governance  strategies  motivated  by  ideology  and  the  value  of  the  self-determination.
Notably,  the  above-mentioned  implications  for  international  recognition  revolve  around  the
ideological set-up of the group, which affects the actor’s decision regarding how it has managed
certain conditions such as the population under control, the competing militias, and the international
community. 
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The Weight of Ideology for Non-State Actors
Historical and political  developments have a huge impact  on the formation of non-state actors.
According  to  the  time-frame  and  the  socio-political  situation  of  the  area,  NSAGs  develop
differently  their  ideologies  and  the  symbolic  processes  they  choose  to  enact.  Ideology  then
structures rebel’s strategies, and it is exerted when dealing with different conditions of governance
such  as  the  population  under  control,  competing  militias,  and  the  international  community.
Inevitably, ideology leads to confrontation, and thus it has a huge role in shaping the regional and
international destiny of the group. There are mainly two strategies that a non-state actor can adopt
when acting under a strong ideology: the “power ideology trade-off” and the “extremist discount”
(Keiser et al. 2014: 13-16). The former suggests that the group is willing to sacrifice part of its
ideological-political  agenda  when  this  is  distant  from the  preferences  of  the  population  under
control  and  of  the  international  community.  The  latter  indicates  that  despite  rebels  may  offer
services and infrastructures, coercion and violence will always be preferred because the actor does
not want to compromise ideologically its position and wants to pursue its aim. These strategies end
up  affecting  the  self-determination  when  a  group  is  aiming  for  recognition  or  a  role  in  the
international system. That is why these dynamics enlighten us on how non-state actors approach the
conditions that may favour the self-determination. Particularly, these strategies are exerted in this
work to show how ISIS has profited from coercion and violent methods to impose its role within
Iraq  and Syria,  whereas  Hezbollah  has  rather  opted  for  the  sacrifice  of  different  religious  and
cultural traits to gain resilience inside the Lebanese state. Showing the relevant examples of these
approaches,  it  will  be  possible  to  draw a  dividing  line  between  the  two groups  to  show their
differences  and understand  what  conditions  favoured  ISIS’s  self-determination  and Hezbollah’s
denial of the Islamic State. 
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Methodology 
Given that few studies investigated self-determination coming by Islamist armed groups, I have
developed a  qualitative method based on multiple  case studies.  Particularly,  I  used  within-case
studies  to  assimilate  the  experiences  of  each  actor.  This  approach  provided  me  with  in-depth
knowledge about the chosen subject and it made me think about several implications. However, the
within-case study was not enough and after developing distinct cases, I implemented a between-
case study to compare the group’s experiences and unravel certain involvements replying to the
research  question.  This  allowed  me  to  interpret  the  findings  and  connect  them  to  the  rebel
governance theories used in the thesis, together with enlightening the role of non-state actors in the
international  scenario.  On  the  other  hand,  not  having  the  opportunity  of  interviewing  and
conducting surveys is a clear limitation in this study. Moreover, the non-state actors’ position is
subject to change in the jeopardized context of the Middle East and this condition could affect my
results. 
To conclude, I have mainly explored the available literature on rebel governance and rebel
strategies,  with an eye for works treating ideology as one of the main variables.  In addition,  I
deepened  on  works  that  explained  the  self-determination’s  value  for  violent  actors.  For  the
analytical  chapters,  the  literature  on  ISIS  and  Hezbollah  gave  me  a  better  overview  of  their
historical and political formation. I have read these works to find a connection between certain
behaviours and the governance strategies addressed in this work. Specifically, I have analysed the
data by tracing examples of ISIS’s extremism in relation to different dimensions of governance,
whereas  I  have  tried  to  point  out  Hezbollah’s  pragmatism  relatively  to  the  same  dimensions.
Through  the  narrative  analysis  thus,  I  managed  to  look at  the  groups’ historical,  political  and
ideological  contexts,  to  interpret  the  meaning  of  their  strategic  choices  and  finally  achieve  an
understanding of the reasons behind the self-determination. 
Thesis Overview 
The  thesis  is  divided into  three  chapters.  Chapter  one  functions  as  a  theoretical  framework to
explain the concepts used throughout the work. Starting from rebel governance, it will deepen on
the  main  strategies  that  non-state  actors  exert  on  territories  and  people.  Its  core  will  be  the
explanation  of  the  relevance  of  ideology  and  its  role  in  the  “power  ideology  trade-off”  and
“extremist discount”. Furthermore, the modalities with which the international community assess
self-determination claims and attacks from armed entities aiming for international legal personality
will be explained. 
Chapter two will be a within-case analysis of ISIS. Particularly, it will start with a historical
overview  that  shows  the  actor’s  ideological  and  political  formation.  It  will  then  develop  its
ideological path with emphasis on its extremism, and continue by showing how this extremism is
exerted on the population under the caliphate’s control.  The next paragraph will  deepen on the
relationship of ISIS with its ally al-Nusra and consequently with its “parent” organization al-Qaeda,
whereas  the  last  will  display  the  implications  and  the  relationships  of  the  group  with  the
international community. These categories will show how ISIS adopted the “extremist discount”
logic and how this together with Iraqi and Syrian context encouraged the self-determination. 
Chapter three regards Hezbollah’s case and it will be structured in the same way as chapter
two.  Starting  from  the  historical  and  ideological  contexts  to  understand  what  socio-political
conditions led to the creation of the “Party of God”, I will unfold its relationship with the Lebanese
population, the Lebanese Armed Forces and the international community. In this way, the “power
ideology trade-off” will be displayed to unravel the conditions that made the entrance into politics
more profitable than declaring the Islamic State. 
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Chapter One
Rebel Governance and Self-Determination in the International Political Arena 
To  understand  how  NSAGs  approach  the  self-determination,  we  must  consider  how  they  are
affected by the time frame and the challenges they face during their formation period, and how they
exert power until the decision to declare, or not to, statehood.
Nonetheless, when we investigate non-state actors,  we must refer to a series of theoretical
implications. These are represented by theories of rebel governance or how a de facto state exerts
power whereas competing with the state authority. These theories shed light on the actor’s strategies
and what ideological and symbolic processes (Arjona et al. 2015: 74) are exploited when they come
to terms with the population,  the state  authority,  other  competing groups,  and the international
community (intended as the number of states being part of the UN). Indeed, ideology represents the
starting point for the group’s agendas and approaches. For this reason, it is necessary to analyse how
certain behaviours can be considered the product of two main ideological strategies: the “power
ideology trade-off” and the “extremist discount” (Keister et al. 2014: 13-16). 
The interest is seeing how these strategies affected the choice to proclaim, or not to, the Islamic
State. Indeed, self-determination plays the main role because of its implications for international
law.  In  the  current  state  of  affairs,  after  the  decolonization  processes,  the  self-determination,
whether it is for total independence or economic reasons (e.g. Hong Kong in China which entered
the WTO before its patron state), must be taken into consideration by the international community.
Thus, how does the international community react to a group’s self-determination? What are the
criteria for recognizing it as a state? How should the community intervene if the de facto state is
exploiting violent methods? Understanding these dynamics, before analysing the single cases in the
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next chapters, can be useful in investigating the calculus made by the two non-state actors when
entering the power games of the international arena.
1.1 Rebel Governance: Coercion or Service Provision?
Different  studies  in  International  Relations  focused  on  the  state  and  the  government  as  the
overarching  subjects,  whereas  others  have  emphasised  non-state  actors.  In  this  context,  only
considering  non-state  actors  as  much  important  as  governments  will  allow  having  a  more
comprehensive framework. This paragraph aims to explain the concept of rebel governance, to then
focus on the main strategies which compose rebel rule and allow non-state actors to exert authority
justified by compliance: coercion and service provision.
To start  with  a  broad definition,  rebel  governance  means  “organization  of  civilians  within
rebel-held  territory for  a  public  purpose”  (Kasfir  in  Arjona et  al.  2015:  24).  Thus,  governance
implies  one  of  three  different  rebel  activities:  encouraging  civilian  participation,  organizing
civilians to obtain a material gain, and providing civilian administration.  The definition is nuanced,
but the term is used to indicate how non-state actors administrate a territory and the population
under their control. Indeed, according to Kasfir (Arjona et al. 2015: 27):
“Rebel Governance can occur  only after an insurgent organization gains control  over territory that
contains civilians and decides to create or encourage civilian structures”.
The control of a territory is crucial to exert power and to gain legitimacy. However, compliance is
also pivotal to the life of rebels because it implies that the population is prone to rebel rule. Indeed,
as pointed out by Kasfir (Ibid.), the other basic aspect which produces rebel governance is civilians.
When a population is living in a territory held by a rebel organisation, rebels must decide how to
act, and if include civilians into processes of governance. While there can be insurgents that occupy
an unpopulated area for security reasons, the most of them usually chose populated areas because
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they need to “increase their resources by organizing civilians” (Kasfir in Arjona et al. 2015: 29).
However,  encouraging  civilian  participation  does  not  exclude  violence.  As  it  will  be  outlined,
participation and compliance can be gained through coercion or voluntary involvement (Ibid.: 34).
Once we have defined the basic dimensions of rebel governance, we should think about the
main rebel strategies. As a relevant part of the literature supports, these are coercion and service
provision. When we talk about coercion, we refer to an obligation imposed on someone with the use
of force. Still, “coercion need not to [always] involve the direct application of violence” (Keister et
al. 2014: 6). Indeed, the rebels may develop their coercive apparatus, but not using it, preferring to
obtain compliance through a demonstration of strength. As Richards states (1996), this happened
with Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF), that was mutilating the population to show
its  capability  to  use  violence  against  non-compliant  civilians.  Although  this  practice  seems
attractive, even coercion has its costs and rebels must always calculate that violence is most likely
to create discontent throughout the population. Indeed, 
“coercion always increases the rebel’s ability to stay in power but the more coercive they become, the
less effective each additional increase of coercion becomes in generating compliance” (Keister et al.
2014: 6).
That is why when a group takes advantage of coercion, it means that it has a strong power-base and
finances. This should make us think about why some groups keep coercing when they know it is
risky. 
To  this  end,  even  scholars  such  as  Gramsci  supported  the  importance  of  the  civilians’
“spontaneous consent” (Gramsci in Storey 1994: 214), and that the rulers should not rely entirely on
coercion. In fact, the other strategy pursued by rebels is service or welfare provision, intended as a
wide range of activities devoted to someone, in exchange for something else. Service provision
often makes rebels more palatable for the population, and this can increase their compliance and
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consequently the rebel’s legitimacy. Despite this, even service provision is quite costly: providing
hospitals, educational resources, food, and water imply a large-scale organization that most rebel
groups do not  have.  Still,  even smaller-scale  services  “have a  meaningful  impact  on  civilians’
wellbeing”  (Keister  et  al.  2014:  7).  What  matters  about  service  provision  is  that  it  generates
voluntary support for rebels (Ibid.: 8), so that if they need to use violent methods (e.g. in cases of
menaces from the state authority and international intervention), these could create less resentment
within the population. 
Although it can be argued that coercion and service provision are not useful to investigate self-
determination claims, this does not mean that they have an impact only inside the actor’s regional
sphere of influence. Indeed, when these strategies come from an entity wishing to become a state,
they  are  always  put  under  scrutiny  by  the  international  community.  In  this  context,  regional
strategies affect the decision about self-determination, and consequently the international response.
However, contextualization is necessary when interpreting rebel’s actions because the time frame,
the disposable income, and the type of territory and population under control have a great impact on
the strategic calculus. Nevertheless, the main aspect when dealing with non-state actors is their
ideology, because it eases the decision about what agenda to pursue.
1.2  The  Role  of  Ideology:  The  “Power  Ideology  Trade-off”  and  the  “Extremist
Discount”
Ideology has always been entrenched with sovereign claims to gain legitimacy from the population.
When  dealing  with  ideology,  we  need  to  consider  all  the  symbolic  processes  that  constitute
governance strategies. Indeed, the 
“use of  symbolic  processes by insurgents  is  often systematic  and can serve both instrumental  and
normative purposes by entrenching and legitimizing the insurgent political authority” (Mampilly in
Arjona et al. 2015: 76).
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As well as coercion and service provision, “the importance of symbols in propagating a political
authority hinges on two central  concepts relating governments to their  publics:  compliance and
legitimacy”  (Ibid.:  79).  Thus,  symbolic  processes  create  consent  derived  from  “coincident
preferences  of  the  political  authority  and  the  governed”  (Ibid.).  However,  we  are  referring  to
symbolic processes as a result of the group’s ideology. Indeed, a movement’s creation must refer to
some ideological premises affected by certain historical and political contexts. Why do non-state
actors decide to compete with the state? Ideology is the building block of rebel’s strategies, and it
influences them regarding the management of territories and populations but also with respect to
other militias and the international community. Consequently, ideology affects the outputs of the
rebel’s strategies. Particularly, 
“ideological distance makes civilians [and not only] skeptical about the rebel’s intentions and thus leery
of cooperating with rebels too readily” (Keister et al. 2014: 10). 
Thus, we need to consider how much rebels care about the ideological position they choose to
enact because they are “neither ‘realpolitikers’ willing to sacrifice all ideals for compliance, nor
‘ideologues’ who pursue ideology at the expense of pragmatic power considerations” (Ibid.: 14).
Indeed, it is unlikely that non-state actors have the chance to stay completely loyal to their ideology
while obtaining compliance and legitimacy. In this light, they face, as it is called by Keister and
Slantchev  (2014),  the  “power  ideology  trade-off”.  This  means  that  they  must  compromise
ideologically because it is convenient. Non-state actors must calculate if their ideas are far from that
of  the  population  (and from that  of  the  international  community),  and if  their  ideology  is  too
extremist, they should be willing to change their agendas.  
Rebels  who  want  to  maximize  compliance  are  supposed  to  implement  policies  that  are
ideologically near to civilians’ preferences, whereas ideological rebels want to pursue ideology, and
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they need to exert coercion. Consequently, “the more extremist the rebels, the fewer services they
provide, the more coercive their rule becomes, and less compliance they generate” (Ibid.: 15). This
output is the “extremist discount” that makes services less efficient when the actor’s ideology is far
from that of the population (and from international laws). The result is that, even when the extremist
rebels provide services, they need to coerce more to gain what they could have gained with co-
option. 
“Extremists are coercive in this model not because they have a taste for violence but because their
ideological distance from civilians means that  in  order to make service provision effective,  rebel’s
policy concessions have to be fairly significant, which makes non-coercive rule unattractive to the
rebels” (Ibid.).
Radical groups know that when service provision is ineffective and costly, coercion may be the
only solution available. To make an example, we can look to the situation in Syria before 2013 self-
determination of ISIS: at the beginning, to oppose the Assad regime, jihadists were used to offer
services in the city  of al-Raqqa.  However,  given the ideological  distance of the Syrian median
civilian,  and  the  worsening  of  the  crisis,  the  “group  compromised  less  and less”  (Hassan  and
Dettmer in Keister et al. 2014: 18) and by 2014, the “ISIS’s platform clearly diverged from civilian
preferences, and the group’s rule was increasingly brutal […] demonstrating both their ideological
position and their willingness to use coercion against civilians” (Lister and Mendelsohn in Keister
et al. 2014: 18).
These  choices,  altered  by  ideology,  affect  the  non-state  actor’s  image  to  the  eyes  of  the
international community. Every action by the de facto state is weighted and it corresponds to a reply
by the international community. Ideology then plays a pivotal role in structuring the rebel’s policies
and consequently the calculus of the self-determination. 
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1.3 Explaining the Concepts: Statehood, De Facto States, and Self-Determination
Understanding the rebel’s strategies and the self-determination means that we must be aware of the
debates regarding the concept of statehood for actors aiming for international legal personality. 
Given the lack of consensus about what can be considered a state, usually, we must refer to the
Article  1  of  the  1993  Montevideo  Convention  on  the  Right  and  Duties  of  States  (Radan  in
Caspersen et al. 2011: 130; Longobardo 2017: 11). This is useful for assessing self-determination
claims because it sets different criteria for statehood, namely “(1) a permanent population; (2) a
defined territory; (3) a government; and (4) the capacity to enter into relations with other states”.
This fourth criterion is important because, according to the constitutive theory of international law,
the entity joins statehood when it is recognized by other states (Oppenheim 1905: 110; Kelsen in
Longobardo 2017:11). Another theory, the factual one, states that “territory and the population are
[…] the spatial and personal scope in which the government normally exercises its powers and
fulfils its duties” (Quadri in Longobardo 2017: 12-13). In this context, no authority can decide if an
entity  is  entitled  to  be a  state.  However,  nowadays it  is  impossible  to  assess  rebels’ strategies
without considering the international community’s role. Thus, the framework to which international
law scholars refer is the “legalistic theory” which states that, despite exercising sovereign powers,
the entity may not enjoy international personality if it does not respect the rules of international
laws. 
As for statehood, there is confusion about the non-state actor aspiring to be a state. Above, I
used the term de facto state because it seems the most reliable in international law1. Nonetheless, for
some  international  lawyers,  the  de  facto  state  cannot  exist  because  “if  a  territory  meets  the
conditions  of  statehood,  it  is  a state” (Ker-Lindsay 2017:  4).  Alternatives  are  concepts  such as
“unrecognized states” and “contested states”, while “separatist states” and “breakaway states” have
1 See Caspersen et.al (2011),  Unrecognized States in the International System, Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group;
Ker-Lindsay  (2017),  Secession  and  Recongition  in  Foreign  Policy,  World  Politics,  Oxford  University  Press;
Longobardo (2017), The Self-proclaimed Statehood of the Islamic State between 2014 and 2017 and International Law,
Anuario Espanol de Derecho Internacional 33, p.205-228; Worster (2016), Relative International Legal Personality of
Non-State Actors, Brooklyn Journal of International Law, Vol.42, No.1.
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been used, making more difficult to frame the de facto state (Ibid.). Other scholars such as Kolstø
sustained the idea of an “unrecognized quasi-state” (Kolstø in Caspersen et al. 2011: 131) which
exist  when the declaration of independence has been discarded by the international community.
Consequently,  it  is  difficult  to  understand  if  non-state  actors  have  the  characteristics  to  enjoy
international legal personality. As different works states, these entities enjoy right and duties under
international  law2,  although  the  debate  about  international  legal  personality  depends  on  the
involvement of the non-state actor in the international sphere (Klabbers in Worster 2016: 211). 
The same theoretical debates regard self-determination because its rhetoric was a product of
decolonization processes after World War II. Most of scholars “would agree that self-determination
is  a  loaded  term  often  identified  closely  with  secession  and  thus  […]  extremely  destructive”
(Gardner 2011: 10). Nevertheless, looking to a basic definition, we could say that “the principle of
self-determination can be defined as freedom from alien domination and freedom to choose a form
of government” (Ibid.: 8). Stilz (2016), resuming Cassese’s (1995)3 theory, distinguishes between
two aspects: the “internal” which refers to people’s right to choose a government that reflects their
ideologies, and the “external” that denotes people’s right to be free from outside interference. These
aspects are entrenched with the popular sovereignty’s role in self-determination claims. However, it
is debatable if people share a will with these declarations, given that in the modern state it is not
usual to see citizenry contracted together to form a political community. Moreover, “every citizenry
is riven with diversity. And since groups rarely agree on anything in politics, it is unclear how ‘the
people’ can share a will” (Stilz in Sobel et al. 2016: 101). That is why we must consider the non-
state actors’ elites and their ideologies to understand governance strategies and the calculus of self-
determination. 
2 Worster  (2016)  elaborates  this  information  according  to  several  works.  See  Jan  Klabbers,  (I  Can’t  Get  No)
Recognition: Subjects Doctrine and the Emergence of Non-State Actors,  in J. Petman & L. Klabbers,  eds., Nordic
Cosmopolitanism:  Essays  in  International  Law  for  Martti  Koskenniemi  369  (2003);  Wolfgang  Friedmann,  The
Changing Structure of International Law 213-15 (1964); G. Schwarzenberger, A Manual of International Law 48 (1st
ed., 1947); Hersch Lauterpacht, The Subjects of the Law of Nations, 63 L. QTRLY REV. 444 (1947).
3 A. Cassese (1995), Self-determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal, Cambridge University Press, p. 5-12.
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1.4 The Criteria for Assessing Self-Determination Claims
The criteria used for assessing the self-determination need to be developed to unravel the strategic
calculus behind the declaration, or demise, of territorial sovereignty.
The  aforementioned  criteria  set  by  Article  1  of  the  1993 Montevideo  Convention4 cannot
explain how the international community decides to recognize the non-state actor’s sovereignty.
Indeed, after the Cold War-era “state behavior on a variety of fronts appears increasingly linked to
norms of  human rights  and democratic  governance”  (Gardner  2011:  4).  Thus,  even if  political
agendas are still relevant, democratization is strictly entrenched with the community’s vision when
assessing self-determination claims. Fostering democratization through democratic state-building
strategies seems to be the priority for securing international peace. Consequently, one of the main
criteria is the democratic capacity of the non-state actor. Precisely, the self-determination is assessed
according to how much the rebels resemble the internalized standards of governance typical of
recognized  State  entities  (Ibid.:  6).  The  international  recognition  and  the  non-state  actor’s
empowerment are explained in figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1 Democratic Capacity and International Empowerment
 Gardner, A. M. (2011), Democratic Governance and Non-State Actors, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 7.
4 The  criteria  are  described  in  paragraph  1.3  Explaining  the  Concepts:  Statehood,  De  Facto  States, and  Self-
determination. 
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It  must  be  said  that  the  international  community’s  behaviour  does  not  represent  a  shared
consensus among all the members. As a matter of fact, it reflects the view of legitimacy in the eyes
of dominant states in the community. Indeed, if we refer to the community as the states being part of
the United Nations, we can see that the latter reflects “asymmetries in global power, privileging the
views and interests of the West” (Kymlicka 2007: 11). Thus, this collective legitimation crafts the
strategies of the international community because it represents the views of the “respected” part of
the global community of states (Sills in Krasno 2004: 47-76). Consequently, the response to self-
determination claims is weighted according to international (more “Westerners”) norms developed
in the framework of human rights standards and democratic governance. 
As for rebel strategies,  the international community has different ways of replying to self-
determination claims. Namely, it can exert coercion, persuasion, or social influence (Gardner 2011:
28). Some examples of these strategies can be seen in figure 1.2. 
Figure 1.2 International Empowerment and Approaches
 Gardner, A. M. (2011), Democratic Governance and Non-State Actors, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 28.
These strategies aim to make the non-state actor follow international rules and internalize forms of
democratic governance.  The community has different ways to verify if  rebels have internalized
certain norms. Particularly, it values representation and popular participation; mechanisms to solve
20
conflicts without violence; toleration of minorities. In this way, the community assesses if there is a
low or high level of capacity in internalizing democratic standards (Gardner 2011: 33-36). Figure
1.1 can be reformulated according to these new pieces of information in figure 1.3.
Figure 1.3 Democratic Capacity and International Empowerment
 Gardner, A. M. (2011), Democratic Governance and Non-State Actors, Palgrave Macmillan, p. 39.
The  contested  state’s  authority  is  the  last  entity  to  keep  in  mind  when  theorizing  self-
determination. Indeed, it may be possible that high levels of oppression and discrimination could
lead to the empowerment or even recognition for the rebels. This risk is correlated to the self-right
to  defence  when  someone  does  not  respect  the  basic  principles  of  international  law in  armed
conflicts. However, it is difficult to understand how the international community assesses claims by
actors who exert violence for their agendas. That is why we need to make some considerations
about rebels involved in violent conflicts.
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1.5 The International Response to Belligerent Non-State Actors
The debate regarding NSAGs operating in violent conflicts  is  problematic because we lack the
means to identify who has the right to exert violence and who has to be stopped for causing harm,
even  beyond  the  regional  context5.  Gardner  (2011)  talks  about  the  international  law’s
ineffectiveness in  fostering a resolution to  conflicts  arising from self-determination claims,  and
consequently the failure of the international community in the face of geopolitical interests. 
The problem of recognition is even more articulated if one considers the UN Charter6. Indeed,
its prohibition on the use of force set in Article 2(4) is related to states in any event, while non-state
actors such as liberation movements are not mentioned (Chadwick in Saul 2014: 303). Thus, it is
not possible to determine whether non-state actors have any legal rights in exerting violence to
achieve self-determination, or if violence is justified by the state’s oppression. Even terrorist actions
cannot be properly assessed when the militia is competing with an oppressive patron state. For this
reason, Chadwick exposes that “legal prohibitions against force cannot prevent force being utilised”
(Ibid.: 313). Moreover, if actors are denied any membership in the international community, then
they are not bound by any conflict-reducing mechanisms and “[n]o international conventions can be
applied on their territory and no effective monitoring is possible” (Kolstø in Caspersen et al. 2011:
110).  This  lack  of  transparency  becomes  attractive  for  criminal  business  and  violent  actions.
Consequently, the “unregulated status of the unrecognized states affect the lives of their citizens,
[and] it may also represent a danger to the outside world, in particular - but not limited to - their
immediate neighbours” (Caspersen et al. 2011: 110). This should make us think about the logic of
non-recognition and its  advantages.  Although non-recognition is the input for  de facto  states in
5 e.g. Think of terrorist actions to enforce self-determination claims such as the 1972 massacre during the Olympic
Games in Munich by the Black September Organisation.
6 Charter of the United Nations, Preamble, Arts 1(2) and 55. See UN General Assembly Resolutions 1541 (XV) (15
December  1960),  2625  (XXV)  (24  October  1970),  and  60/145  (14  February  2006).  See  also  the  two  1966  UN
International Human Rights Covenants, Common Art. 1.
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internalizing  democratic  practices,  it  can  create  the  opposite  effect:  leading  the  actor  to  exert
extreme violence  knowing that  the  international  community  is  compelled by certain  loopholes.
Legitimacy indeed does not come only from external sources, but it comes also from who tacitly
accepts the rebel’s rule. Therefore, pursuing the “extremist discount” could be the right strategy to
gain  compliance  and  appeal  at  an  international  level.  However,  as  stated  above,  if  the  group
manages to internalize democratic practices, it could at least gain some insurances about its rights
and  role  in  the  international  scenario.  Given  this  uncertainty,  the  elite’s  pragmatism  must  be
considered  when  dealing  with  entities  who  weigh  self-determination  claims  based  on  their
ideological, historical and socio-political contexts.
Another issue regards how the international community exploits the violent policies that rebels
apply to the populations.  Indeed, the only mechanism is extending the application of International
Humanitarian Law (IHL) to increase the personality of non-state actors and bound them to certain
legal regulations (Worster 2016: 233). In this framework, the international community wants the
non-state actors to be covered by humanitarian law, despite it does not want the rebels to enjoy
“benefits of statehood or […] ignorance of jus cogens7 violations” (Ibid.: 238). This strategy falls in
the so-called “equality of belligerents”, for which combatants must be treated equally to the states
against whom they are fighting for an effective application of a code of the law of armed conflict
(Somer in Worster 2016: 238). The main issue is that non-state actors are now treated as if they
enjoy international legal personality to the eyes of the international community. Hence, actors who
do not care for external recognition but rather aim for international resonance may benefit from
being treated as a state entity, reinforcing their position vìs a vìs the various opponents. If a group is
treated as a state by virtue of the crimes it perpetrates, then the international community ends up
legitimizing its power base, which sees the actor as an international personality, for better or worse.
Moreover, not recognizing a violent group does not prevent it from affecting the policies of the
7 In international law, jus cogens norms are set to protect fundamental values to which one cannot in any way derogate. 
The jus cogens is perceived by members of the international community as an absolutely mandatory right.
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international community. Whether it is exploiting violence or more democratic means, it will always
be engaged with the community’s response, thus showing itself capable of bearing international
pressure. 
With  these  considerations  in  mind,  it  should  be  easier  to  analyse  ISIS  and  Hezbollah,
contextualizing how their ideologies affected the strategic choices, and the result of declaring, or
not to, territorial sovereignty to the eyes of the international community.
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Chapter Two
ISIS’s Extremism: The Self-Determination Path
Understanding the conditions for ISIS’s self-determination implies a within-case study. To do so, I
need to to show examples of its  extremist ideological project regarding multiple dimensions of
governance. The analysis must be related to the governance strategies enacted and to the criteria for
assessing self-determination claims by the international community. Nonetheless, it must be kept in
mind that the group’s formation is not independent of the international intervention in Iraq and
Syria as well as the incapacity of Arab states to “represent the interests of their citizens and to
construct an inclusive national identity strong enough to generate social cohesion” (Gerges 2016:
5).  
Firstly, it is necessary to start from a historical framework that could lay the basis to understand
what  damages  have  been  inflicted  on  the  Iraqi  and  Syrian  social  fabrics.  This  will  show  the
development of the new global Salafi-jihadism and how the group reinvented itself by handling a
socially and religiously fragmented situation through an extremist approach.
The historical context introduces ISIS’s ideological development, and how it has applied the
“extremist discount” to become the new vanguard of worldwide jihadism. This framework displays
how certain dynamics were reproduced even before Baghdadi declared the Islamic State. Moreover,
the troubled relationship between ISIS and its “parent” organization al-Qaeda Central8 is pivotal to
understanding ISIS’s jihadist project.
The  other  dimension  under  scrutiny  concerns  ISIS’s  relationship  with  the  Iraqi/Syrian
populations. Governance strategies involve the organization of people, thus it is not possible to
evaluate  the  self-determination  without  knowing how ISIS  manages  its  territories.  Governance
8 “Central” is the definition given by Gerges (2016) to distinguish between the leadership of bin Laden and Zawahiri
from that of Zarqawi and his successors as leaders of al-Qaeda in Iraq.
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strategies are always assessed by the international community when they come from an actor that
aims for recognition. Thus, I claim that ISIS’s way of ruling empowers the extremist approach, as it
is different from other Salafi groups seen until now. 
Moreover, the plurality of armed actors within Iraq and Syria must be taken into account. The
relationship between ISIS and its counterpart al-Nusra offers interesting examples of an extremist
approach.  This  adds  another  piece  to  the  puzzle  about  the  reasons  for  declaring  territorial
sovereignty. 
Finally, non-state actors are often the products of international intervention in troubled and
poor areas, and their willingness to oppose both states and the community comes from a rejection of
international  law and  its  imposition  on  Middle  Eastern  states.  Thus,  I  state  that  analysing  the
group’s  behaviour in  accordance  with  its  ideology  and  in  opposition  to  the  dictates  of  the
international community clarifies the value of the self-determination. Indeed, ISIS proposes violent
jihad against the “near enemy”, but at the same time, it is capable of protracting actions against the
West,  changing the asset and responses of the international community. This influence can explain
the modalities with which the group seeks legitimation through the self-determination.  
2.1 ISIS’s Historical Path
Understanding ISIS’s formation implies accounting for the international intervention and the state-
building processes in Iraq. “Nation-building” processes implied the state as the only provider of
security  and stability,   therefore,  the  Weberian  ideal  kept  spreading.  This  led  to  the  failure  of
western  projects  to  stabilize  the  Middle  East  (Calculli  2019:  2)  and  contributed  to  increasing
sectarian tensions since the 2003 invasion of the country. In this fragmented context, armed groups
took advantage of divisions within the population, developing their anti-western and Islamist logic.
The  devastation  of  state  institutions  as  well  as  the  establishment  of  a  sectarian-based political
system, contributed to  the polarization along Sunni-Shia divide,  preparing the state  to  a never-
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ending struggle moved by identity politics (Gerges 2016: 68). With the deposition of Hussein and
the dismantling of Iraqi security institutions, the country found itself in political, economic, and
social chaos. In the absence of a nationalist framework to rebuild the country, the new politics of
exclusion of prime minister Nuri al-Maliki exacerbated the sectarian divide. His Shiite government
treated Iraqi-Sunnis as second class citizens, despite the collaboration with Sunni groups to counter
the  developing  hegemony  of  Salafi  actors.  This  relationship  deteriorated  because  of  the
government’s authoritarian tendencies, reaching an end after the Arab Springs between 2010 and
2011 (Spencer et al. in Gerges 2016: 106). In this context, ISIS rebranded itself, gaining authority
and showing how “the proliferation of irregular armed groups is mainly seen as the unintended
consequence of an ill-conceived policy” (Calculli 2019: 2) by the international forces. 
How did ISIS take advantage of the Iraqi socio-political situation? This happened well before
Baghdadi declared the Islamic State. Precisely, it started with the growing influence of al-Qaeda in
the area. Growing sectarianism gave the most powerful Salafi group at that time the opportunity to
blend in with local Sunnis, who were convinced that the order left by the U.S. empowered the Shias
and neighbouring Iran (Gerges 2016: 69). Moreover, with 9/11 al-Qaeda’s legitimacy had already
been grown within Islamist circles. Therefore, before ISIS’s birth, one of al-Qaeda most influential
men, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, was developing an extremist rhetoric that would have caused further
affliction to the country. Trained in Afghanistan and imprisoned by the U.S., Zarqawi developed his
ideals through a harsh interpretation of the Qu’ran. When he moved to Iraq, he found himself at a
time  when  al-Qaeda’s  top  leaders  needed  support  while  wanted  and  dispersed  throughout  the
Middle East. Thus, Iraq provided Zarqawi with “a stage and a social base of support that allowed
him to charts his own vision, a path that marked another radical twist in the journey of the global
jihadist” (Gerges 2016: 59). Despite this, he swore baiya (loyalty) to bin Laden, changing the name
of its jihadi group in al-Qaeda in Iraq in 2004 (AQI). However, his relentless actions against both
Sunnis and Shias ended up affecting his relationship with al-Qaeda Central. Indeed, Zarqawi’s logic
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of “total war”9 almost ended the jihadist project in Iraq, although it succeeded to survive attacks
from the U.S. supporting Maliki’s government. When Zarqawi was killed by the U.S. in 2006, AQI
was  rebranded  as  the  Islamic  State  of  Iraq  (ISI),  and  his  successors  continued  to  implement
extremist methods. Moreover, ISI resilience lied in the failed project of creating a Sunni-moderate
militia by the government. Although this Sunni Sawha project backed by the American Awakening
program initially punished ISI, its growing influence became an alarming issue for Maliki, hostile to
the empowerment of Sunnis (Burns et al. in Gerges 2016: 105). The mistrust erupted when the Iraqi
government was put in charge of the Sawha militias by the U.S., now considered a betrayer by
several  leaders  who  harshly  criticized  Maliki’s  Shiite  government  (Gerges  2016:  106).
Consequently, the total absence of national social cohesion as well as of a leader reinforced the
climb to power of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who managed to make of ISI the most powerful jihadi
group in the international arena.
Baghdadi, as well as Zarqawi, started his jihadist path after being released from Camp Bucca,
an American prison. Baghdadi took control of ISI after the death of his predecessor, Abu Omar al-
Baghdadi, and from the beginning, he started to restore the group’s logic around seventh century-
old Islam. His vision made him capable of recruiting desperate Iraqis who were attracted by glory
and salaries, managing to “transform a fragile organization on the brink of collapse into a mini
professional army, an army capable of waging urban and guerrilla warfare as well as conventional
warfare” (Gerges 2016: 143). Strategic conquers allowed the group to attract local Sunni militias
that saw in ISI’s project a solution to Maliki’s sectarian governance. With plenty of suicide bombers
and  a  good  centralized  operational  infrastructure,  ISI  survived  American  and  Iraqi  attacks,
rebuilding its ranks and slowly penetrating Syria from 2011 on. 
In  Syria,  Hafez al-Assad and his  son Bashar  crafted the  country’s  socio-economic  context
along sectarian lines. Social, political and economic power was distributed strategically to favour
9 War against any religious community or government that does not abide to the Caliphate’s rule.
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who followed the Alawite’s10 rule. Despite the majority of businessman and politicians were Sunni,
the rulers managed to secure a strong political base, which enjoyed the economic liberalization,
whereas people in the suburbs, small cities, and especially rural areas were affected by poverty and
displacement (Barout in Gerges 2016: 171). However, the Arab Uprising allowed ISI to overthrow
the established order, as well  as to sneak into the country. The growing violence of the Syrian
security  forces  against  peaceful  protesters  ended  up  radicalising  the  uprising.  Moreover,  the
presence of radicalised personalities within the protesters was the result of a strategic calculation by
the Assad regime, that issued an amnesty to release Islamist prisoners from the Sednayya prison on
26 March 2011 to justify violent security methods (Lister 2015: 55).  At this point, “Islamist armed
groups and the Islamist rhetoric of jihad were empowered [and] their existence becoming somewhat
justified in the eyes of a significant proportion of Syrians”  (Gerges 2016: 174). Despite ISI did not
promote any participation, the group recruited Syrian Sunnis, tribal and local coalitions, together
with foreign fighters and skilled Iraqi lieutenants. This led to the designation of Abu Muhammad al-
Joulani as the leader of the Syrian “branch” of ISI and al-Qaeda Central, Jabat al-Nusra. The group,
heavily supported, penetrated the country building relationships with influential personalities and
businessmen,  indoctrinating  Islamists  with  the  opening  of  the  al-Dawa11 office  (Ibid.:  181).
Nevertheless, al-Nusra’s and Joulani’s surge, favoured by a nationalist/moderate vision12, ended up
threatening  ISI’s  unity  and  Baghdadi’s  ambitions.  Thus,  in  April  2013,  the  “caliph”  decided
unilaterally to dissolve both ISI and al-Nusra, officially declaring the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
(ISIS) (Ibid.: 188). This led to a power struggle between Baghdadi and Joulani, who consequently
10 Alawism is a branch of Shia Islam, although its theology and rituals differs from it. They are significantly present in
Syria, Turkey, and Lebanon.
11 Literally “the call to religion”-Al Dawa offices are religious proselytization offices used to propagate a particular
religious ideology.
12 Joulani was contrary to the logic of “total war” against Sunnis and innocents. Moreover, the presence of Syrian
combatants inside its ranks reinforced the idea that al-Nusra was becoming a counter-Assad movement with different
priorities than ISI.
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defied ISIS by swearing allegiance to Zawahiri (who had taken the place of bin Laden in al-Qaeda
Central’s leadership). This defiance turned into a war inside Syria, ended with ISIS consolidating its
conquests  and  taking  control  of  al-Raqqah  (Ibid.:  192).  With  further  strategic  conquers,  ISIS
imposed its rule on part of Syrian territory, applying the extremist logic against whoever opposed its
jihadist project.
The context in which Zarqawi and his successors found themselves posed multiple threats.
From the confrontation with Sunni U.S.-baked militias to the war against al-Nusra, ISIS’s extremist
project had the precedence over moderation and alliances. Although the group had to compromise at
the beginning, the “experience it acquired in the decade-long battle against the U.S.-led coalition in
Iraq” allowed it to form “a solid military command and control in both Syria and Iraq” (Ibid.: 194).
This  reinforced  its  powerful  image  both  to  the  eyes  of  Arabic  countries  and  the  international
community. Moreover, profiting from the failed Arab Uprisings and the international conflict of
interests regarding the Syrian issue, ISIS’s force lied in exacerbating the sectarian and ideological
divide, proposing a “solution” to all the sidelined Sunnis who perceived Shias as the power holders.
2.2 The Ideology of the Islamic State
“O Muslims, Islam was never for a day the religion of peace. Islam is the religion of war. Your Prophet
(peace be upon him) was dispatched with the sword”13.
By stepping in a void left by sectarian policies and the ambiguities of the international community,
ISIS  reconstructed  “Iraq’s  supra-state  identity  (Arabism and nationalism)  along  sectarian  terms
(pan-Sunni), challenging the very foundation of the separate nation-state as well as the norms and
rules  that  underpin  international  society”  (Gerges  2016:  12).  Ideology  is  essential  because  it
structures governance strategies and binds together Salafi-jihadist combatants as well as activists,
giving legitimacy to the group. 
13 Baghdadi, “March Forth Whether Light or Heavy”.
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ISIS has a totalitarian world-view that  refers  to  seventh-century Arabia,  brutally  punishing
whoever opposes its rule based on the Sharia. While the political pluralism is eliminated, the group
successfully  presents  as  the  only  movement  capable  of  resurrecting  the  caliphate  and  gaining
salvation for young Muslims betrayed by their governments (Adnani in Gerges 2016: 46). However,
its extremism is to be found in the movement’s first footsteps, when Zarqawi took the leadership of
al-Qaeda in Iraq. As previously mentioned, he learned the Qu’ran during the detention, and his poor
background made him develop a thought more extreme than the one of the jihadist “grandmasters”
such  as  bin  Laden.  Indeed,  he  theorized  the  “total  war”  against  Shias,  Sunnis  and  Arabic
governments  prone  to  the  international  rule,  entering  a  new  wave  of  jihadists  with  different
priorities ideologically opposed to the ones of al-Qaeda Central (Gerges 2016: 87). For Zarqawi and
its followers, “shock value, slaughter, and blood speak louder than words”, waging a war without
limits (Ibid.: 90), a tendency that further alienated al-Qaeda’s top-leaders and its mullā. 
Al-Baghdadi did not change the approach. He exerted violence against Shias and Sunnis who
tried to oppose its rule, reinforcing the “extremist discount” logic and his image to the eyes of
competing groups. In this way, thanks to its ideological cohesiveness, ISI sustained itself between
2006 and 2011, profiting from the troubled development of the Sunni Arab identity, and co-opting
even officers from Hussein regime, making them migrate from Baathism to Salafi-jihadism (Ibid.:
158). The absence of solid national identity and security allowed the group to fill the governance
and ideational voids (Barnard et al. 2015: 1) that attracted more support than ever before. Notably,
the migration of Baathist and nationalist officers into ISI’s orbit  “is a testimony to the breakdown
of Iraq’s state institutions and the transformation of the new ruling elite and social classes” (Gerges
2016:  160).  Nevertheless,  the relationship between the newborn ISIS and its  skilful  lieutenants
rapidly changed. After capturing Mosul in 2014, the group purged its ranks by arresting and killing
many of the former Baathist and nationalist personalities. “Mosul was purged not only of “deviant”
Baathists but also of its cosmopolitanism and cultural diversity” (Ibid.: 128). This purge displays
the extremism and the ideological distance of ISIS from al-Qaeda, which never supported violence
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against Sunnis willing to collaborate, despite its economic conditions constrained its top-leaders to
maintain the alliance with Baghdadi (Ibid.: 238). The disdain for compromise ultimately affected
ISIS’s relationship with its “patron” group and with al-Nusra in Syria. Their conflict goes beyond
the dispute for territory and authority: it is rather a philosophical and ideological war that is fought
along tribal, ethnic and nationalist lines (Adnani 2014: 1). I support that the “extremist discount”
heavily affected ISIS’s strategies when dealing with its allies. As soon as the group gained authority
and legitimacy, it has started a civil war which culminated in a two-pronged action in 2013 to take
the control of the jihadist movement and transform its identity (Gerges 2016: 247). Moreover, ISIS
aims to replace Zawahiri  and win the war  of  narratives  against  its  old allies  by trying to  take
possession of al-Qaeda’s logic of war against Western powers (Ibid.: 251). The clarity of ISIS’s
ideological and strategic message helped it in replacing al-Qaeda leadership because it reached a
wide portion of Arab Sunni, especially with the self-determination in 2013. Indeed, the power of
ISIS’s messianic ideology lied in the transnational effect of this message, which attracted many
foreign fighters and Islamist militants from all over the world. 
ISIS fighters are known for being committed to their cause, blindly posing their faith in the
Hakimiyya’s  principles14,  and  denouncing  whoever  does  not  follow  the  caliphate’s  rule.   ISIS
depicts its fighters as “soldiers of the caliphate” (al-Dalimi et al.  in Gerges 2016: 274) and the
saviours of the Sunni community. In this way, they are invested with a sort of divine mission that
can only bring them fame and fortune.  For many ISIS fighters,  whether  they are foreigners  or
jihadist veterans, “ideology is the superglue that cements their commitment to the group” (Ibid.:
274) and reinforces ISIS’s military apparatus and its  appeal to Islamists.  Moreover,  undercover
fighters in Europe or the U.S. seem to share an ideological commitment to ISIS’s cause. Suffering
from discrimination, especially the youth is vulnerable to ISIS’s resilient image and violent logic.
People find a safe place in it because they are empowered by the “sanctity” of the mission, and thus
14 It represents the unrelenting value of God’s rule on earth, opposed to the will of people.
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create a bridge allowing the group to strike in the earth of Western countries with “far-reaching
political and social consequences” (Ibid.: 231). 
This context should make us aware of the weight of ideology in ISIS’s strategies. The logic of
“total  war” affected its relationships with al-Qaeda and other Salafi-jihadist groups, whereas its
ideological commitment attracted flows of fighters and skilled professionals. By developing a strict
ideology and exerting power through violence ISIS challenges both the statehood of Arab countries
and the Weberian state imposed by the international intervention. Furthermore, it is attracting as
much Islamists as possible, filling an ideational void to create a state legitimized by its population,
despite being addressed as a terrorist organization. Besides, declaring the Islamic State without al-
Qaeda’s permission or other affiliate militias is relevant to understanding the value and the purpose
of the group’s self-determination. 
2.3 Rebel Governance and Population
The entity who aims to supplant the state authority must define how to manage the population and
the territory under its control. Democratic or not, governance strategies require the political, social
and ideological organization of people. The Islamic State is not exempt, and its governance outlines
the value of ideology while adding another piece to the puzzle of the self-determination. Indeed,
challenging the international community, ISIS developed a Gianus approach prone to extremism, as
a consequence of governing multiple confessional realities within Iraq and Syria. It is also worth to
mention how, in contrast with the international precepts regarding democratic governance, ISIS first
developed a rudimentary infrastructure of administration, and then it has eradicated any form of
dissent, proving its violent feature. 
Regarding infrastructures,  ISIS filled  the  void left  by Iraqi  and Syrian  administrations,  by
creating a rudimentary but functional bureaucracy together with institutions in cities such as al-
Raqqah, Mosul, Fallujah and Deir al-Zour (Gerges 2016: 265).  Jihadists improved security and
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order creating jobs in the fragile economy of the area and they delivered services such as bakeries,
hospitals,  garbage collection  and day-care  centres  (Arango 2015:  1;  Shubert  2015:  1;  Karouny
2014:  1;  Mroue 2015: 1).  ISIS even established a  Consumer Protection Authority Office in  al-
Raqqah,  which forced shops “to close for selling poor products in the  suq (market)  as well  as
regular supermarkets and kebab stands” (Zelin 2014: 1). The group also runs an electricity office
that  handles  the  repairs  of  older  power  lines  and  the  installation  of  new  ones,  together  with
rehabilitating roads and make them aesthetically pleasant  (Ibid.).  In this  way, ISIS handled the
population, making it dependent on its service infrastructure and thus prone to its rule. Moreover, if
ISIS managed to implement these governance systems, it was because of a significant portion of
former Iraqi Baathist officials, who were aware of the steps to take in the formation of the caliphate
(Smith in Oosterveld et al. 2017: 11). 
These services proved efficient, but they need economic support and thus are very costly for
the population. Despite strategic conquests rewarded ISIS with oil, gas, and salt, one of its main
financial resources is the taxation system (Solomon 2015: 1). According to IHS Global Strategies,
almost 50% of the group’s revenue comes from taxes and fines (Gerges 2016: 268), which are
collected  mostly  from Shias  and  Christians.  The  Zakat15 is  heavily  implemented,  and whoever
avoids  it,  ends  up  being  killed  or  severely  punished.  As  reported  by  people  living  under  the
caliphate’s  control,  no  one  dares  not  to  pay  ISIS’s  bills  because  of  the  religious  police’s
punishments. The hisbah is mainly composed of Sunnis living in rural areas who are empowered by
the Islamic State and thus even more loyal to it (Abdul-Ahad 2018: 1). Coercion and fear represent
ISIS’s main tools, and despite dissent within the civilians, the reality left by previous governments
deeply deluded both Iraqis and Syrians. Although ISIS shows commitment to providing services, it
carries  massive  killings  which  reify  its  ideological  distance  from  the  confessional  realities  it
controls.  I  assert  that  the  Shaitat  tribe’s  massacre  in  Abu Hamam (Eastern  Syria)  is  a  striking
15 Taxation system imposed in seventh/eighth century Arabia to people of different religions in order not to get purged
from Islam conquered territories.
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example of how the “extremist discount” favours the use of violence.  In less than three days, ISIS
fighters killed, beheaded and even crucified hundreds of the tribe’s members who tried to oppose
the caliphate’s governance. The massacre constrained the population to accept ISIS’s rule, whereas
the silence of the international community further reinforced its sense of invincibility (Sly 2014: 1). 
Besides, the regulation of daily life is dependent on the religious interpretations of the Qur’an.
In every place conquered by the Islamic State, diversity and culture have been erased to leave space
to a totalitarian religious system displaying ISIS’s adhesion to its ideology. This approach is aimed
to  “change  the  political  culture  of  Iraq  and  Syria  so  that  the  ISIS  model  would  continue
indefinitely” (Gerges 2016: 272). Indeed, by empowering Sunnis living in rural  areas,  ISIS has
linked its interests with agrarian and tribal elements, building a power base that supports the group
and reinforce its extremist methods (Ibid.: 273).
ISIS’s two-folded approach mitigates extreme violence with the provision of basic services and
primary  goods.  Nevertheless,  the  group  has  rarely  invested  social  capital  in  governance’s
infrastructure,  a  common  character  to  the  Salafi-jihadist  actors  who  prioritize  “warfare  over
welfare”  (Ibid.:  280).  Discarding  democracy,  ISIS  challenges  the  precepts  of  the  international
community and displays its preference for violence when it comes to regulating governance issues.
Through these examples, I insist that the group does not seek legitimacy within the international
community  because  it  does  not  follow  their  criteria  or  regulations  to  governing  people
democratically. Rather, its jihadists are imposing a new personality both to the populations and the
territories they control, creating a new identity that transcends the progress made in international
law and frames itself in in the utopia of seventh-century Arabia. This new constituency, reinforced
by foreign supporters, may have favoured the self-determination.
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2.4 The Troubled Relationship Between ISIS and al-Nusra
Non-state  actors  operating in  the same area cannot  prevent  from dealing with each other.  ISIS
stands  as  an  example  of  how  extremist  ideological  and  political  projects  can  lead  to  violent
confrontations. Its relationship with al-Nusra serves to interpret the irreconcilability between the
new jihadist  project and that theorized by al-Qaeda.  Moreover,  understanding how the growing
influence of al-Nusra alarmed Baghdadi and his circle can further enlighten the reasons behind
ISIS’s self-determination. 
Syrian socio-economic and political situation was characterised by growing sectarianism that
affected the uprisings in 2011. In the same year,  Osama bin Laden’s death boosted Baghdadi’s
intention to fill the power vacuum left by the al-Qaeda’s leader as well as expanding its influence
over Iraq. Profiting from the uprisings, Baghdadi and his circle sent two lieutenants in Syria, Abu
Muhammad al-Joulani and Mullah Fawzi al-Dulaimi, to create a jihadist cell that could counter the
Assad regime and take over the country (Ali 2015: 1). Without announcing ISI’s and al-Qaeda’s
presence,  Baghdadi  and Zawahiri  provided al-Nusra with skilled combatants,  money,  and arms
(Gerges  2016:  176).  However,  Joulani  presented  its  group  as  a  continuation  of  the  Syrian
mujahideen opposition to  Assad,  gaining confidence from several  radicalised militias.  The new
organization stood as a defence movement for Sunnis persecuted by the Assad regime by relying on
Syrian Sunni recruits. The name chosen by Joulani indicated the desire to be seen as a nationalist
group rather than a Salafi militia (Ibid.). Among multiple armed factions in Syria, between 2012 and
2013, al-Nusra positioned the military asset in poor and rural areas, where the majority of the Sunni
population was illuded by Assad’s governance. By siding ideologically with Zawahiri and al-Qaeda,
Joulani developed a moderate approach toward the Sunni constituency, showing sensitivity to the
public feeling of displacement, improving the group’s image and gaining more support (Ibid.: 182).
In this context, al-Nusra was perceived as a liberation movement acting with a different approach
than ISI’s extremist one. This opposition is clear in the words of one of al-Nusra’s spokesman, Abu
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Adnan, who stated that the group was nothing as AQI/ISI (Abouzeid 2012: 1), and in a group’s
pronouncement that claimed the intention not to enforce the Sharia law in Syria (Gerges 2016: 184).
What is stunning about al-Nusra’s is that Joulani gained notoriety and power by defending the
Sunni population, appealing to them through a nationalist logic, and allying with different militias
to  replace  the  Assad  regime.  Despite  resorting  to  violence,  al-Nusra  became  one  of  the  most
powerful actors in the area, being active in eleven of the thirteen provinces in Syria (IHS 2013: 1). 
This surge alarmed Baghdadi who wanted to restore its control over what was perceived as
ISI’s project. Through an audio statement, Baghdadi claimed that al-Nusra’s ultimate goal was to
pave the way to ISI, dissolving unilaterally the two entities and announcing the birth of the Islamic
State of Iraq and Syria (Gerges 2016: 188). Applying the “extremist discount”, Baghdadi warned
every Islamist group that avoiding allegiance would have meant to be treated as enemies. Joulani’s
response outlined how he was neither aware or agreed with the decision. Even Zawahiri stated that
the  Islamic  State’s  declaration  was a  violation  of  al-Qaeda’s  order  not  to  announce  an  official
presence  of  the  jihadists  (Zawahiri  2014:  1).  However,  when  Joulani  pledged  allegiance  to
Zawahiri, he showed how the Islamist project of taking over Syria was becoming a power struggle
between powerful allies. Zawahiri asked Baghdadi and Joulani to preserve the divide, but by doing
this,  he  outlined  his  support  for  the  Syrian  leader  (Gerges  2016:  190).  Joulani’s  position  was
considered a threat  by Baghdadi,  as it  was clear  that  al-Nusra was the most  powerful  Islamist
organization in Syria. This meant that ISIS had to settle itself in the area, starting a brand new
project and changing its agenda. To re-establish its role, ISIS co-opted former militants of al-Nusra,
who saw better prospects in Baghdadi’s project. Sticking to its extremist ideology, ISIS prioritized
the war against al-Nusra rather than against Assad’s forces (Ibid.:191) to take back the control of
important  strategic  zones  such  al-Raqqah  and  the  Deir  al-Zour  province.  Although  al-Nusra’s
resistance together with other Syrian/Islamist factions was fierce, by the summer of 2014 ISIS had
captured  95%  of  the  Deir  al-Zour  province,  which  is  known  for  being  a  resource-rich  zone
(Associated Press 2014: 1). The number of resources at ISIS’s disposal,  allowed it to seize the
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control of other areas, making the people living there dependent on the group. This shows again the
ideological divide with al-Nusra, that had built its constituency through popular support. However,
the main consequence was that Islamist factions saw in ISIS a powerful ally and the only group
capable of countering Assad. This led to recruiting more combatants and professionals from all over
the Middle East, thanks to the group’s huge finances. 
In  the end,  after  the “victory” against  al-Nusra,  ISIS switched again its  interests  into Iraq
conquering  more  areas  and  dissolving  the  international  border  which  was  separating  the  two
countries. At this point, ISIS was a reality, and the group demonstrated that its tactics of breaking
down the border through violence had worked (Gerges 2016: 196). By declaring the Islamic State,
ISIS  showed  that  it  needed  to  take  back  control  of  its  project.  Both  Joulani’s  and  Zawahiri’s
reactions say a lot about the extremist logic implemented by the “caliphate”. By openly disobeying
to its “parent” organization, ISIS showed the incompatibility of its ideology with the old jihadist
project of countering the far-enemy. I argue that this need to re-establish the role in Syria, together
with taking the reins of the global jihadist project, it is useful to understand why Baghdadi decided
to declare statehood and to pursue the “extremist discount”, openly attacking al-Nusra and covertly
threatening Zawahiri’s moral and political leadership. 
2.5 Challenging the International Community
ISIS challenges the neighbouring Arab states and the international society by conquering strategic
areas, exerting violence and cementing its Salafi-jihadist ideology within the Sunni constituency.
Therefore, it  is impossible to assess the self-determination without analysing ISIS’s relationship
with the international community. The failure of the liberal sovereignty project and the international
discordance in addressing the problems of Iraq and Syria created the perfect scenario for ISIS’s
proliferation and reinforcement. In this context, the Islamic State considers itself as a legitimate
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actor who can challenge any authority that steps between the group and its ideological/political
project.
ISIS draws a dividing line with past Salafi-jihadist agendas. Since its birth, it has developed a
“total war” logic that prefers the war against Shias and the Arabic governments that allowed for the
penetration of the liberal state into the Middle East, independently of religious identity. However,
the group aims to replace al-Qaeda’s leadership of the global Salafi-jihadist project. The necessity
to absorb the logic of war against the “far enemy”, as it was theorized by bin Laden and Zawahiri,
has led ISIS to incorporate the typical strategies of a terrorist movement. This switch of priorities
resulted in a series of violent actions against members of the international community. Among them,
on October 31st, 2015, the group placed an explosive device into a Russian jet directed to Sinai,
killing 224 people. Again, less than a month after the plane crash, ISIS carried out seven suicide
bombings in Paris, cooperating with its cells in Belgium and France, killing plenty of civilians and
spreading fear in the heart of Europe (Gerges 2016: 250). At this point, the distinction between the
“far”  and  the  “near  enemy”  has  been  erased,  although  the  group’s  number  one  priority  is  to
consolidate its rule in Iraq and Syria. Nevertheless, there are other reasons for attacking outside the
Middle East. It should be noted that ISIS suffered different setbacks starting from 2015, the same
year in which they attacked the West. This tactic is supposed to divert the attention from the group
military losses in Iraq and Syria, to reinforce its image of invincibility (Ibid.: 6). As the group
suffers setbacks in territories under its control, it organizes attacks on foreign targets, instilling fear
and  discouragement  within  the  countries  of  the  international  community  and  reinforcing  its
legitimacy to the eyes of “wannabe” jihadists. 
This point unravels how the relationship with the international community is built upon a tug-
of-war given by the historical, political and ideological conditions that led to ISIS’s development.
Indeed, although the international community lacks a proper framework for addressing non-state
actors, it is known that democratic governance is still considered the common reference point16.
16 Look at the criteria for assessing self-determination claims from violent actors in Chapter One.
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Thus, if one refers to ISIS’s governance strategies both at home and abroad, it is clear that there is
no possibility for its recognition. In this case, what does the group aiming for? It seems that ISIS
aims at reinforcing its image to the eyes of Salafi militants and professionals from all over the world
through violent displays of power. This is reinforced by data displaying how many foreign fighters
and skilled professionals left their country to reach the Islamic State after the caliphate’s declaration
(Dilanian 2015: 1). Moreover, the group connected regional and international politics by exerting
violence and declaring the Islamic State (Gerges 2016: 143), gaining international legal personality
by virtue of the crimes it  has committed.  This  happened because addressing a militia with the
violation of the International Humanitarian Law (Worster 2015: 233) is a double-edged sword that
ends  up  reinforcing  and  legitimating  ISIS,  invested  with  an  international  personality  to  its
follower’s eyes. Also, foreign fighters and professionals from Western countries imposed a change
in international agendas, because people do not feel safe any more (Gerges 2016: 45). 
ISIS screens its status outside of its territories by challenging the international community and
the  Arab  states.  Thus,  I  affirm  that  the  self-determination  becomes  the  means  through  which
discarding  the  democratic  Weberian-state  imposed  by  the  international  influence,  offering  an
alternative to all the displaced Sunnis in the world. This displacement brought by the international
intervention,  together  with the failure of the Arab states to  construct  a  stable  national  identity,
allowed ISIS to increase its  authority across the Middle East and abroad. Furthermore,  the gap
between the targets of the international community’s members has bolstered ISIS’s surge. Indeed, at
the  beginnings  of  the  Syrian  Uprisings,  the  distance  between  the  members  has  expanded  the
development  of  the  Salafi-jihadist  identity.  Despite  entering  the  conflict  these  countries  are
unwilling  to  deploy  a  significant  number  of  troops  because  they  fear  to  enter  the  group’s
apocalyptic narrative (Ibid.: 49). Thus, the creation of the Islamic State has stood between these
implications, at a moment when the immobility of the international community and the failure of
the state system in the Middle East allowed the group to develop its extremist narrative. Profiting
from the negative image of the U.S. to the eyes of the Sunni community, ISIS exerted international
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divergences  and  weaknesses  to  create  a  power  base  that  poses  hopes  and  finances  into  the
caliphate’s work.
To  conclude,  one  may  argue  that  ISIS’s  conquers  in  the  Middle  East  might  not  affect
international responses. On the contrary, the negotiations between ISIS and Turkey, in 2014, show
how the group has managed to be treated like a  state  without  being recognised as  such. After
capturing Mosul, ISIS has negotiated for the liberation of Turkish citizens working in the state’s
embassy,  whereas  Erdoğan allowed for the transnational flow of fighters and weapons crossing
Turkey to Syria. This attracted criticism from the members of the international community accusing
the president of allowing ISIS’s reinforcement. Oppositely, Erdoğan insisted on prioritizing the war
against Assad in Syria (Ibid.: 285). The gap between the various states’ agendas again allowed ISIS
to  enter  international  politics  without  being  recognized.  Indeed,  the  deal  with  the  Turkish
government represented a huge diplomatic breakthrough for the Islamic State, because it had shown
that its violent approach could have been merged with political slyness. Eventually, the “extremist
discount” logic prevailed and led the group to bring on terrorist  attacks against  Kurdish-Turks,
ultimately triggering Turkey and losing an opportunity to legitimize its role (Ibid.: 286).
Nonetheless, it is interesting to outline how ISIS survived despite being considered a menace
by almost every state and militia across the world. Although the group has suffered setbacks and has
lost almost all of its territory until now (Myre et al.: 1), the power and the resilience of its message
should make us reflect on the value of its self-determination. Despite being conscious of the risks of
being  targeted  as  a  terrorist  organization,  ISIS  pursued  its  extremist  vision  of  politics  and
governance, challenging the international community and affecting the policies and the agendas of
different powerful countries. The self-determination then is a consequence of the socio-political
formation of Iraq and Syria, which favoured the development of ISIS’s ideology and created the
conditions  to  apply  the  “extremist  discount”.  Moreover,  it  serves  the  purpose  of  rejecting  the
structure of state sovereignty imposed by the West, whereas offering an “alternative revolutionary
model based on Islamic identity” (Gerges 2016: 286).
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Chapter Three
Hezbollah’s Pragmatism: Becoming the “Party of God”
Hezbollah is well-known for its pragmatic leadership. The Shia movement – labelled as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization (FTO) by part of the international community – survived years of pressures
from the U.S., Israel, the Lebanese army and other militias. Still willing to create an Islamic State in
Lebanon,  the  group  reinvented  itself  becoming  active  in  the  country’s  political  system.
Understanding what allowed it to this change is the base for an in-depth case-study analysis. For
comparison purposes, the dimensions analysed will be the same in chapter two. The argument is
supported by examples of the events that favoured Hezbollah’s pragmatism, together with strategies
related to the “power ideology trade-off”. Opposite to ISIS, the study must elucidate the conditions
for not declaring the Islamic State, despite the latter is Hezbollah’s ultimate aim, described in the
open letter of February 16th, 1985. However, the role of the international intervention cannot be set
aside as well as the clash for power between political leaders and armed movements. 
The historical framework emphasizes how Lebanon was divided along sectarian terms, and
how  the  international  community  has  interfered  with  the  state’s  sovereignty,  favouring  the
proliferation of armed groups. I assert that this is helpful to analyse the conditions which convinced
Hezbollah to re-shape its  modus operandi to include a wider portion of the Lebanese population
into governance strategies, avoiding the spread of sectarianism and appealing to a sense of national
unity. 
Understanding  Hezbollah’s  history  leads  to  a  nuanced  description  of  its  ideological  and
political formation. Inter alia, Hezbollah developed an ideology that rejects the confessional state in
Lebanon, whereas it has sacrificed part of its Shia political programme. Furthermore, the logic of
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“resistance” (muqawāma) allow us to understand Hezbollah’s political project and the reasons not
to declare territorial sovereignty. 
The way in which Hezbollah replaces  the state  authority  when dealing with  the Lebanese
population exposes how the group is aligned with the democracy advocated by the international
community. Indeed, Hezbollah proved its inclusive logic to Sunnis and Christians who suffered
years  of  conflicts  creating an efficient  system of  infrastructures  and showing the  government’s
weaknesses. 
Dealing with conflicts  leads  us  to  consider  how Lebanon’s  history is  characterised  by the
succession  of  a  plethora of  militias  that  aimed  for  recognition  and  socio-political  redemption.
Despite there have been several confrontations, I analyse how Hezbollah improved its cooperation
with different militias. Particularly, the group has sacrificed part of its identity to manage national
crises and avoid violent conflicts. In this context, the “power ideology trade-off” has played the
main role when dealing with groups such as the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), the Shia counter-
movement Amal, and even the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) of Michel Aoun. 
To  conclude,  I  analyse  Hezbollah’s  relationship  with  the  international  community.  Indeed,
despite the tug-of-war with multiple countries and the refusal of the American and Israeli influence
in  Lebanon,  Hezbollah  has  incorporated  the  logic  of  international  law  through  measures  that
resemble the ones of the war on terror and the defence of state’s borders, whereas being compliant
with the norms and institutions of the international community (Calculli 2018: 136-139). Profiting
from certain developments in the jeopardized situation of the Middle East, the group has gained
resilience  and  has  avoided  fatal  confrontations  through  the  “power  ideology  trade-off”.  This
enlightens  us on the value of  the self-determination and displays the conditions  that  dissuaded
Hezbollah from declaring territorial sovereignty.
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3.1 Hezbollah’s Historical Path 
To understand Hezbollah’s creation I  must deepen on the relationships among various religious
identities  in  Lebanon,  as  well  as  the  governments  that  allowed  for  the  penetration  of  foreign
interests into Lebanese affairs. The country obtained independence from France in 1943, and given
its  confessional pluralism, the government’s roles were divided between Maronites, Sunnis, and
Shias. However, the Pact resembled the interests of the Maronites, so that few political spaces were
given to Muslim communities (Harb 2006: 1). The confessional divide erupted in 1958 when Arab
nationalists  started  to  contest  the  Christian  president  Chamoun.  Whereas  the  Christian
administration was entering the sphere of influence of the U.S., the nationalists (mainly Muslims)
asked  for  joining  Syria  and  Egypt  in  the  “United  Arab  Republic”  (Calculli  2019:  11).  The
confrontation was settled with the American intervention on July 25th, 1958. The “Operation Blue
Bat” was intended to restore the stability of Lebanon, although the real purpose was to defend the
pro-Western and Christian identity of the state (Ibid.). 
Still, the Civil War (started in 1975) led to a second intervention. The confrontation between
the Christian forces of Bashir  Gemayel and Saad Haddad, and the joint forces of the Palestine
Liberation  Organization  (PLO)  and  Muslim  militias,  led  to  the  creation  of  UNIFIL17 in  1978
through two UN Security Council Resolutions (425; 426), and the Multinational Force (MNF) in
1982, whose members are Italy, France, Britain and the U.S. (Ibid.). UNIFIL aimed to restore the
country’s peace, reinforcing the government’s authority, and limiting PLO’s anti-Israel activities.
Nevertheless,  the impression that UNIFIL was empowering Christians and Israel  reinforced the
sentiment of Muslim actors in Lebanon. This led to the development of a logic of  muqawāma
(resistance) against the international intervention, theorized by Imam Musa al-Sadr, the founder of
the  Shia  movement  Amal (Calculli  2018:  66).  However,  with his  disappearance  in  1978 while
travelling to Libya, the group ended up being co-opted by the Christians, whereas its revolutionary
17 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon.
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force ended with the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in 1982 (Operation “Peace for Galilee”)
(Ibid.: 74).
The invasion was not deterred by UNIFIL, which complemented the Israeli Defence Forces
(IDF) and the Christian militias of the “South Lebanon Army” led by Saad Haddad (Calculli 2019:
11). Moreover, the MNF instituted to reinforce the U.S. brokered ceasefire between Israel and PLO
served  as  a  cover  of  international  neutrality,  while  its  members  were  pursuing  their  agendas.
Notably, the U.S. completed the reinforcement of the Christians, backing the election of Bashir
Gemayel as the new president of Lebanon on August 23rd, 1982 (Ibid.: 12). Gemayel’s intention, as
the  leader  of  the  “Lebanese  Forces”,  was to  sign for  peace  with  Israel,  whereas  expelling  the
Palestinians from Lebanon and reiterating its neutrality (Ibid.). Eventually, as soon as the MNF left
the country, Gemayel was killed on September 14th, 1982. Without the international presence the
Phalanges, perceiving the PLO as responsible for Gemayel’s assassination, massacred more than
three thousand Palestinian refugees in Beirut’s  camps of Sabra and Shatila,  backed by the IDF
(Ibid.). Consequently, armed Islamist organizations emerged in a context where southern Lebanon
was reduced to displacement because of the attempts to integrate it into Israeli administration. As
stated above,  Amal  was challenging the disparity  between Christians  and Muslims,  although it
lacked an ideological commitment after al-Sadr’s disappearance. Moreover, with the co-optation of
its leader Nabih Berri by the Maronites, the group avoided open confrontations with Israel. This
immobility led to a break between the leader and its military chief, Husayn al-Musawi, who laid the
foundations for the creation of Amal al-Islamiyya, that eventually became Hezbollah thanks to the
participation of other Shiite militants and Communists (Qāsim in Calculli 2018: 74; Calculli 2019:
12).  Further  reinforced  by  the  Iranian  Revolution  in  1979,  Hezbollah  emerged  as  a  force
challenging the Christians and their confessional government, together with American and Israeli
influence. This position culminated in two infamous attacks against two MNF units, American and
French,  in  Beirut  on  October  23rd, 1983  (Calculli  2019:  12).  Despite  the  repudiation  of  the
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international community, the future events concerning Lebanon proved that the group had to rely on
more pragmatic methods, not to be erased by enemies and circumstances.  
With the end of the Civil War and the implementation of the Ta’if agreement in 198918, the
group was in danger because of the Syrian protectorate on the country. Whereas the protectorate
served as a stabilizer, it was not willing to give power to Islamist factions. At that time, Syria was
entering the American influence maintaining the confessional feature of Lebanon by putting aside
both Christians and Shias (Calculli 2018: 84). The need to choose between radical opposition and
the acceptance of the new “Lebanese State” posed a threat to the movement, because of the dialectic
between purist  and pragmatic  Islamists.  Despite  this,  Hezbollah adopted a  compliant  approach,
ousting  extremist  personalities  such  as  its  first  designated  Secretary  General  Subhi  al-Tufaiily
(Ibid.: 92). Thus, its leadership established a political party that could counter the government’s
decision from a legitimate position, although Hezbollah continued to define itself as a “movement”
(Calculli 2019: 13). I claim that the concept of “movement” of resistance (muqawāma) is important
to unravel what conditions led the group not to declare the Islamic State mentioned in the risala al-
maftuha19. Moreover, the death of Khomeini in Iran and the succession of Khatami as president of
the  country  boosted  Hezbollah’s  transition  from  militia  to  a  political  party.  The  new  Iranian
government was trying to reform its position through a moderate approach and was thus unwilling
to support Islamist armed militias (Calculli 2018: 90). Consequently, in 1992, Hezbollah entered
politics,  although it  gained few votes because of the Syrian influence and its  support  to Amal.
Despite the fierce opposition, the group reinforced its ranks asking for a major role for the Shia
communities of the South. 
Again, as a consequence of the war on terror, Hezbollah was targeted by the American bill
Syrian Accountability Act and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act  in 2003 (Calculli 2019: 13).
The U.S. implied the annihilation of actors challenging the legitimate state, by appealing at the
18 The Agreements involved the dismantling of all the militias and the de-confessionalisation of the state’s political
system.
19 It is the “Open Letter” with which the movement presented itself to the world. It contains the ideological positions of
the group, together with part of its agenda at the time of writing.
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debate on legitimation and sovereignty typical  of  the international  law.  Despite  Hezbollah  was
presented as a menace to Lebanon’s sovereignty, it continued its operations also against Israel in the
south. This was possible thanks to improved Syria’s relation due to the new leadership of Bashar al-
Assad, who understood the importance of the Damascus-Hezbollah ties (Calculli 2018: 104-105).
Although Hezbollah’s political influence in the South was growing, the Lebanese political situation
changed again when the Syrian protectorate started to be contested. Popular tensions culminated in
the assassination of Prime Minister Rafik Hariri on February 14th, 2005, triggering the so-called
Cedar Revolution, which gave birth to two political coalitions: the anti-Syrian March 14 Alliance,
and the March 8 Alliance. The confrontation led to the victory of the pro-international forces and
the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon. 
Despite the group’s future seemed to be full of perils, the 2006 war against Israel allowed it to
recover its status quo. Hezbollah resisted the Israeli invasion, triggered by the group’s attacks into
Israeli territories (Myre et al. 2006: 1), thanks to the improvement of its military apparatus, and to
the creation of a liaison with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). This gave the group the strength to
face national crises as well as the intervention into the Syrian Civil War (Calculli 2018: 109). To
handle the situation, Hezbollah had to come to terms with its ideology to enter the government in
2005, one year before the “July War”. In the end, despite the LAF only furnished logistical support
during  the  conflict,  the  Israeli  withdrawal  defined  the  ultimate  political,  military,  and  social
consecration  for  Hezbollah.  The  logic  of  “resistance”  was  now  perceived  as  the  logic  of  the
Lebanese state (Calculli 2018: 115). Moreover, with the acceptance of the UN Resolution 1701,
which presupposed the return of the LAF and UN peacekeepers in southern Lebanon since 1982,
the group further demonstrated its pragmatism. In this context, Hezbollah could count on a trans-
confessional and trans-national legitimacy, showing to be the only entity capable of maintaining
Lebanon’s  sovereignty,  a  point  further  reinforced  as  Lebanese  politicians  had  plotted  against
Hezbollah during the War (Ibid.). 
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Until now, Hezbollah reinforced its status quo without triggering the plethora of confessional
and political realities in the country. To conclude, Hezbollah’s pragmatism can be found even in the
justifications for entering the Syrian Civil War in 2011. Although the intervention triggered both
Sunnis and Shias who saw a moral contradiction in the support of a regime that was violently
repressing the Arab Uprisings altering them in a sectarian war, Hezbollah appealed to different
concepts to avoid losing its power base. Particularly, it incorporated the logic of the preventive war/
war on terror, as a conflict against the takfiris20, as well as the need to protect the Lebanese plural
confessional  reality,  appealing  to  a  sense  of  national  unity  (Ibid.:  134-136).  Incorporating  the
international narrative21, the group collaborated with international forces whereas exerting influence
over  the  Lebanese  socio-political  landscape.  This  framework  displays  how  certain  conditions
suggested the “power ideology trade-off” and affected the decision not to claim the Islamic State,
rather reinforcing a pragmatism that allowed for Hezbollah’s survival across the years.
3.2 The Ideology of the “Party of God”
“...Friends, wherever you are in Lebanon, and no matter which thoughts you entertain […] we share
with you our primary strategic goals […] of making Lebanon the burial place of American and Zionist
projects.  You  [our  friends]  carry  ideas  that  do  not  conform  to  Islam...but  this  does  not  preclude
cooperation with you in order to achieve these goals...”22.
On February 16th, 1985, Hezbollah presented itself to the Lebanese Muslim community. Years of
international  presence  ultimately  triggered  Muslim  militias  against  oppression,  socio-political
inequalities  and the  integration  of  southern  Lebanon by Israel.  Since  the  beginning,  Hezbollah
showed commitment to cooperation and pragmatism, given by the awareness of its leadership of
20 Radical Islamists who kill without distinction every Muslim who does not share their ideology – ISIS’s rhetoric is an
example.
21 These alignment with concepts typical of the international community will be deepened on later, relatively to the 
relationship between Hezbollah and the community.
22 J. Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents from the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto, p. 44.
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being a developing movement. As Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, the current Secretary General of the
group stated23: Hezbollah was still developing and was unable to act freely in the Lebanese context
(Calculli 2018: 72). However, I state that the analysis of the fracture within the Shia movement
Amal during the Lebanese Civil War is needed to understand Hezbollah’s political vision. Amal’s
leader Nabih Berri was co-opted by Bashir Gemayel when he decided to take part in the “National
Salvation Committee” not countering Israel. Consequently, his military chief, Husayn al-Musawi,
mustered southern Shias calling for resistance (Qāsim 2010: 48-50), as Imam Musa al-Sadr did
before him. Thus, Amal al-Islamiyya was born, but the fracture was not simply due to the decision
not to counter Israel. Rather, it was a division between elitist and non-elitist, implying that Amal
was compliant with the hegemonic design of the Christian state (Calculli 2018: 75). This reinforced
the idea that the group’s creation was a social and political necessity rather than a religious one.
Protecting the south further reinforced Hezbollah’s commitment to providing welfare, showing how
the previous government empowered certain communities profiting from sectarian tensions. Also,
the protection of the Lebanese territory displays a pragmatism that accommodated who was not
moved by religious justifications. Particularly, this dialectic convinced a part of ex-communists that,
despite  being  wary  of  its  religious  commitment,  saw in  Hezbollah  the  only  entity  capable  of
resisting the Israeli invasion (Ibid.: 76). 
So far,  Hezbollah’s ideology calls  for the demise of the international intervention,  whereas
appealing to a sense of unity by protecting the South and its  communities. However, given the
group’s Shiite identity, its approach to religion must be properly analysed. In fact, to understand the
decision not to declare the Islamic State, I assert that, besides historical and political contexts, it is
important to consider how the state itself was theorized. To this end, the origin of a modus operandi
which calls for the compromise can be seen again in the risala al-maftuha of 1985:
23 From an interview given to the newspaper “al-Safir” on 27 February 1992.
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“...We are an  umma that abides by the message of Islam. We would like the oppressed and all  the
people  to  study  this  heavenly  message  because  it  is  conducive  to  establishing  justice,  peace  and
tranquillity in this world […]. From this perspective, we do not want to impose Islam on anyone, like
we do not want others to impose upon us their convictions and their political systems. We do not want
Islam to govern Lebanon by force, as political Maronism is governing now”24.
Although  Hezbollah  had  been  influenced  by  the  Iranian  Revolution  of  1979,  Khomeini’s
revolutionary  model  impacted  differently  in  Lebanon,  as  the  socio-political  landscape  diverged
from the Iranian one. That is why the idea of the Islamic State remained vague and without proper
references,  rather becoming an ideological opposition to the confessional state sustained by the
Christians and the international forces (Ibid.: 72). 
The  changes  in  the  Lebanese  socio-political  landscape  reinforce  this  position,  as  well  as
Hezbollah’s commitment to the Islamic State and its “marriage” with the muqawāma. Indeed, after
the implementation of the Tai’f agreements in 1989, the group adjusted its agenda, becoming a
political party in 1992, despite before it had to convince its most extremist members. Among them,
the first Secretary General, Subhi al-Tufaiily, was not compliant with the order emerging from the
Tai’f agreements, and he was unwilling to accept any compromise, inviting the group not to enter
politics and rather pursue the project of the “Islamic State” (Ibid.: 92). As a result, the Secretary was
relieved of duty, and his successor Abbas al-Musawi adopted a more pragmatic approach. The fact
that a militia was entering politics, displayed the need for survival in an adverse context. However,
it also emphasised the value of sacrificing part of the ideology to carve out a space in politics and
survive. Al-Musawi stated that Hezbollah was going to co-exist with the state, although without
legitimizing it. In this way, the group could have changed what it perceived as a corrupted system
working from an institutionalized position (al-Musawi in Saad-Ghorayeb 2002: 28). Moreover, al-
Musawi contextualized the move as a sort of accommodation to gain a stronger position in the
24 J. Alagha, Hizbullah’s Documents from the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto, p. 44.
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future, a move that frames itself into the logic of the “power ideology trade-off”, reinforced by the
claim that “an oppressive government is preferable to chaos” (Ibid.). 
The  Tai’f  agreements  allowed Hezbollah  to  reinforce  the  logic  of  resistance  gaining  more
legitimacy. Indeed, Hezbollah stood among the other movements by linking its interest with that of
southern Lebanon. Moreover, although initially, it preferred to help only Shias and its financiers,
Hezbollah ended up providing services and security to the other religious communities in the area
(Szekely 2012: 1). I argue that this shows again the intent to spread the logic of muqawāma rather
than imposing the Islamic State: as ‘Ali Fayyad claimed, “the base of legitimacy of the “resistance”
is not exclusively Islamic, rather it can be claimed by every religious confession or even from a
secular perspective. Indeed, the “resistance” is perfectly consistent with international law” (Fayyad
in Calculli  2018:  97).  This resistance implies the security  of the Lebanese population,  whereas
appeals to religion are scarcely referred to.  Particularly,  Saad-Ghorayeb claimed that Hezbollah
presented ideological elements tied to the Lebanese nationalism (Saad-Ghorayeb 2002: 78). This
gives birth to interesting implications, although the Islamic identity has always been strong in the
group’s  ideology.  Thus,  more  than  casting  aside  religion,  Hezbollah’s  leadership  renounced  to
representing only the interests of the Shia population, adopting a much more inclusive logic that
refuses the confessional state, and aims for a fairer national order not prone to the international
influence (Calculli 2018: 98). 
Hezbollah reinforced its position vis a vis the state and the international forces by appealing to
a bigger Islamic  umma. Through the logic of  muqawāma, the group presented itself as the only
defender of the Lebanese population. Through sacrifices and revisions of its ideology, Hezbollah
survived and legitimized its position within the state, despite competing against it. This strategy
paid well in the future challenges of the group.
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3.3 Rebel Governance and Population
Countering the governance of the Lebanese confessional state as well as gaining support from the
population,  are  the  main  reasons  that  led  Hezbollah  to  develop a  functional  welfare  providing
system. The necessity to survive in an adverse context affected the leadership’s decision-making
processes that opted for the implementation of democratic governance practices. Thus, is interesting
seeing how Hezbollah has incorporated several features sustained by the international community,
providing services to the displaced communities of Lebanon while protecting the country’s borders.
The governance’s model proposed by the group sees in welfare provision its main characteristic,
showing how years of misgovernment by the Maronites led the country on the brink of collapse and
contributed to spreading sectarian tensions.
Since its electoral participation, Hezbollah adopted a pragmatic approach proving its interests
for  the  Shia  population  in  southern  Lebanon,  competing  against  the  state  and  Amal,  that  was
delivering services to the poor (Szekely 2012: 1). Developing a strong reputation providing welfare
to displaced citizens, building schools, hospitals,  and distributing money, the group enlarged its
power base, that became not limited to the Shiite community. The resonance of its social-service
network allowed Hezbollah to mark itself as a “Lebanese” organization, willing to remove religious
material  where  different  confessional  communities  were  living,  or  rebranding  its  means  of
communication to resemble other Lebanese parties (Ibid.). This approach, marked by the “power
ideology trade-off”,  provided  the  group with  popular  support,  which  proved  vital  when facing
internal and external menaces. 
In this context,  Hezbollah organizes its services arranging financial  aid to its  affiliates and
families in  need;  providing medical care as well  as an educational  system based on Islam that
supports the youth; using dedicated media to spread its message and contribute to the creation of the
myth of an Islamic Lebanese population opposed to Israel (Azani 2013: 904-905). To exert these
strategies, the group counts on a highly organized system of health and social-service organizations.
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Particularly, this system is composed by the Social Unit, the Education Unit and the Islamic Health
Unit (Hamzeh in Flanigan et al. 2009: 124). The Social Unit represents an umbrella for other social
organizations,  including  the  Jihad  Construction  Foundation  that  proved indispensable,  after  the
2006  Israeli  attacks,  in  assessing  the  conflict’s  damages  and  rewarding  reconstruction
compensations to the population of Beirut and the south (Flanigan et al. 2009: 125). Moreover, the
Islamic Health Unit became so effective that was asked to handle operations of several hospitals in
the South and the Bekaa valley previously run by the government (Ibid.). Regarding culture, the
group  offered  primary  and  secondary  education  at  lower  fees  than  their  private  counterparts,
providing students with scholarships, financial assistance and study materials (Ibid.: 126). Besides,
despite services were originally targeted for the Shiite community, the group’s staff claimed that
there were no restrictions especially in the South, where different sects, as well as political parties,
lived in the same mixed areas (Ibid.: 128). 
Hezbollah’s appeal lied in a service system that was better structured compared to Lebanon’s
overtaxed  one.  People  could  rely  on  it  because  they  did  not  have  to  seek  favours  from local
politicians (Ibid.: 132). This allowed reinforcing the logic of resistance by intertwining the group’s
interests with the population’s ones through the struggle for equality, and through the politicization
of charity and welfare organizations to create a resistance movement (Ibid.: 133). Thus, it seems
that  service  provision’s  ultimate  goals  are  control  of  the  population,  support,  and  recruitment.
However, welfare provision is not entirely based on the exchange of services for support. The logic
of resistance implies the achievement of social justice, which can be reached only changing the
sectarian  system  and  providing  social  assistance  (Cammett  2014:  1).  When  welfare  is  well
distributed, it produces a sense of belonging to a community, which in turn leads to psychological
benefits and stability (Ibid.). For this reason, Hezbollah’s welfare system members tend to outline
how services were provided on the basis of need rather than confessional identity (Flanigan et al.
2009: 129). I argue that this aspect further reinforces the idea that sacrificing part of the identity
could have lead to better outputs. 
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To  conclude,  Hezbollah’s  pragmatism  revolved  around  the  combination  of  its  informal
diplomacy and its service provision system. After the Israeli withdrawal in the 2000s, the inclusion
of a wider portion of the population into the logic of resistance was one of the main commitment of
its leadership. Testimony to this, Christians living in the districts of Jazzin, Bint Jbeil, and Hasbaya
among others, were fearing for punishment for having supported Israel. Surprisingly, the chiefs of
the Party went door to door to reassure them that Hezbollah would have treated everyone in the
same way, whereas they were Shiite, Sunnis, or Christians, reinforcing in this way the logic of
protecting the Lebanese identity (Calculli 2018: 99).
Through the management of the population and the sectarian divide, Hezbollah’s ideological
path changed over time and it has been reframed to get socio-political support. Sacrificing part of its
own identity,  the group was legitimized by a power base that profited from its  ideological and
financial commitment. At this point, I support that these conditions display the inconvenience of
declaring the Islamic State after years of politics of inclusion. 
3.4 The Relationship with the LAF and the Alignment with Michel Aoun
An  understanding  of  the  political  project  of  the  “Party  of  God”  cannot  be  divided  from  its
relationship with regular and irregular actors operating in Lebanon. The group had to compete with
multiple militias, but examples of Hezbollah’s pragmatism are well seen in its alignment with other
groups.  Despite  this  was  the  result  of  accommodations  during  challenging  periods,  Hezbollah
intersected a relationship with the LAF and other intelligence and armed actors by adopting features
typical of the state while renouncing to part of its agenda. This connection proved vital when Israel
invaded Lebanon in 2006 as well as for aligning with the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) of Michel
Aoun. 
This  approach  was  imposed  by  the  Syrian  withdrawal  from  Lebanon,  after  the  Cedar
Revolution  and  the  confrontation  between  March  14  and  Mach  8  Alliance.  The  situation  was
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potentially fatal  for Hezbollah,  affected both from the loss of a fundamental  ally  and from the
pressures of the U.S. in the context of the “war on terror”. Thus, as Nasrallah stated25, when the
group entered the government in 2005, it was mainly to counter these pressures as well as to protect
the  resistance  from  possible  attacks  by  the  government  (Calculli  2018:  110).  Furthermore,
Hezbollah was trying to extend its idea of state free from the international influence to the other
Lebanese institutions, among which there was the LAF. While doing this, the group re-invented its
logic erasing the religious valency of its concepts, connecting them to the coexistence of different
confessional realities, intending to gain support from Shias, Sunnis, and Christians as well as people
from the leftist realm of Lebanese politics (Ibid.: 110-111). The group even gave a new meaning to
the concept of jihad. What was theorized as a religious struggle towards the Islamic State, was now
being reshaped as a right to the self-defence of the country’s displaced communities. In this way,
Hezbollah  appealed  instead  to  universally  recognized  concepts  such  as  borders’ and  people’s
defence. By entering politics, Hezbollah disposed of the means to expand its influence, appointing
public officials and new alliances with which the group could overcome the confessional reality of
Lebanon (Ibid.: 112). 
With the “July War” in 2006, the alignment with other national forces provided the possibility
to  expand  the  influence  on  the  LAF.  Although  the  latter  did  not  have  any  major  role  in  the
confrontation26,  it  experienced  the  divide  between  supporters  of  Hezbollah’s  plan  of  national
defence and supporters of the March 14 Alliance (Ibid.: 115). Israeli withdrawal and Hezbollah’s
“victory” proved that  the group was finally  legitimized by the population and the militias  that
believed  in  the  logic  of  muqawāma.  Still,  is  with  the  acceptance  of  the  UN Resolution  1701,
welcomed by the government, that Hezbollah showed that it could handle challenges to its authority
without  resorting  to  violence by accepting  the  return of  the  LAF and the UN peacekeepers  in
southern Lebanon (Ibid.). Moreover, starting in 2005 and reinforced by the 2006 victory, Hezbollah
25  Interview for Russia Today, 17 April 2012.
26 Partly because sidelined by Hezbollah, partly because the Government wanted to outline how the conflict was more 
a war between Israel and the “Party of God”.
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designated several personalities into the main institutions of Lebanon and the LAF, appointing its
public officials  by patronage relationships and sects. Among them, Abbas Ibrahim, chief of the
General Directorate of General Security, proved that through the logic of resistance it would have
been possible to align with intelligence and armed actors (Ibid.: 117). 
Weighting ideology whereas rebranding the jihad proved vital for Hezbollah when it came to
intertwining strategic relationships. Nonetheless, the alignment with the Free Patriotic Movement
(FPM) of Michel Aoun further reinforced its tie with the LAF. Aoun was the Lebanese army’s chief
during the Civil War, but it was constrained to exile because of the Syrian role in the conflict and
the post-war protectorate. With the Tai’f Agreements, the reconstruction of the Lebanese Defence
forces  saw  the  inclusion  of  several  personalities  loyal  to  Aoun  (Ibid.:  119).  With  the  Syrian
withdrawal in 2005, the ex-leader came back to Lebanon and a new Christian constituency was
created around the FPM. However, the March 14 Alliance was contrary to his return. Conscious of
this position, Aoun decided to ally with Hezbollah through the “Memorandum of Understanding”
on February 6th, 2006, characterized by the muqawāma as the connecting point between Hezbollah
and the FPM (Aoun in Calculli 2018: 118). Consequently, officials still loyal to Aoun within the
LAF greeted the return of their chief and the Christian-Shia alignment (Calculli 2018: 120). Finally,
the penetration of muqawāma into the LAF assured a new position for Hezbollah, that was capable
of managing national crisis and future pressures. After entering politics and due to the 2006 victory,
the  group  managed  to  build  a  constituency  that  was  trans-confessional  and  extended  both  to
Defence and intelligence forces. I argue that Hezbollah profited from challenging conditions by
trading the Islamic State project for power and resilience within the Lebanese state, whereas the
exportation of the muqawāma facilitated the process. In this framework, the inclusion of multiple
political  and  confessional  realities  united  against  the  Israeli  presence  not  only  avoided
confrontations  with  other  armed  actors.  They  also  implicitly  discarded  the  benefits  of  self-
determination. 
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3.5 From Resistance to Agency: The Relationship with the International Community
Until this point, Hezbollah re-framed its ideology to survive and being legitimized by the Lebanese
population. Entering politics led the group to tacitly renounce, or at least postpone, the project of
the Islamic State theorized in the  risala al-maftuha,  leaving space to a logic that could provide
support once it  had shown the discrepancies of the Maronite’s government.  However,  although
Hezbollah has shown commitment to trading its ideological and political programme for power, it
has made clear its position by rejecting the American influence and the Israeli presence in southern
Lebanon. The MNF bombings in 1983 are the first violent actions that opened a long-lasting tug-of-
war  between  different  countries  and  the  group.  Moreover,  the  confrontations  with  Israel  are
practical examples of how Hezbollah refused any influence inside Lebanon’s border, despite the
group  exerted  the  Israeli  pressure  to  build  up  its  strategic  relationships  whereas  gaining
legitimization. 
Notwithstanding, the group’s logic ultimately cut out a space for it in the international scenario,
especially if one refers to the justifications for the intervention in the Syrian Civil War. Despite
Lebanon’s economic recession and the harsh criticisms both from Sunnis and Shias following the
intervention, the group proved once again capable of upgrading its concepts to justify the backing of
a  regime  that  was  violently  repressing  the  population’s  demands.  Particularly,  it  did  so  by
reconstructing the concept of muqawāma along with the need to counter the takfiris that threatened
Muslims and Christians living near the Syrian border and by appealing to the defence of the multi-
faced confessional  reality  of  Lebanon (Calculli  2018:  137-139).   Through the discourse  of  the
extremist threat opposed to the Syrian and Lebanese populations, Hezbollah was trying to connect
its interests with that of different confessional realities, adopting a rhetoric that was common to that
of counter-terrorism, and reinforced by several attacks of anti-Assad rebels backed by the Islamists.
However,  with  ISIS’s  terrorist  attacks  abroad,  Hezbollah  found the  perfect  condition  to  finally
reinforce its position within the international community. When in 2015 Europe began to experience
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the violence of the Islamic State, multiple countries had to change their agendas and this led to an
alignment between the U.S., Europe, and Russia that aimed for the demise of ISIS and its allies
(Ibid.:  140).  By switching from countering  Assad to  facing  the  Islamic  State,  the  international
community reinforced the logic that Hezbollah was developing.  Indeed,  Hezbollah outlined the
need to protect the people from the menace of terrorism and managed in this way to align with the
international  community  by  exerting  the  pillars  of  the  “war  on  terror”.  Opposing  itself  to  the
extremists,  the group reified the demise of the Islamic State  project,  because it  was entering a
rhetoric  that  implied  the  defence  of  multiple  religions  and  especially  the  state’s  sovereignty.
Hezbollah  was  now perceived  as  a  regular  force  rather  than  an  unrecognised  actor,  or  even a
terrorist movement. Indeed, the “internationalist” language chose by the group led to a collaboration
with Russia on behalf of Hezbollah’s capacity of conducting guerrilla warfare against the Islamic
State (Lieber 2016: 1), as well as cooperation with western intelligence services such as the CIA
(Calculli 2018: 141). 
In conclusion, despite still being countered by several countries such as the U.S., Hezbollah
was now perceived as an entity capable of defending the state’s borders as well as its sovereignty by
participating to the global counterinsurgency strategy (Ibid.). The interesting fact is that these traits
are typical  of  the international  community,  and are sought  when it  must  assess the democratic
commitment of the entity that wishes for international legal personality. Moreover, the demise of
the sectarian project further reinforced the impression that Hezbollah was fostering a democratic
vision of the confessional realities living in Lebanon, trying to create a link especially between
Muslims and Christians  against  the  takfiris.  Although the  history of  the group is  studded with
tensions with the international community, the adoption of several of its traits cannot fail to raise
certain considerations. It is clear that Hezbollah’s elites have traded their ideals in exchange for
compliance, and that this strategy has extended to the relationship with international entities. The
group has continuously re-negotiated its position between the state and the movement of resistance
by becoming part of the government and building a new  status quo given by the sacrifice of its
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ideological and political agenda. Without seeking recognition openly, the same strategy has been
adopted with the international community and has led to a proficient collaboration with different
countries in the context of the new war on terror. I state that, besides the aforementioned ones, these
conditions explain why the “Party of God” has renounced to the project of the Islamic State, rather
becoming part of the Lebanese one. 
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Conclusion
This work aimed to interpret what conditions may favour or not the self-determination for non-state
armed groups. The cases of ISIS and Hezbollah have been used to ease the analysis, whereas rebel
governance has demonstrated how the insurgents counter the state by showing its weaknesses. I
argued that, in line with its ideology, the actor chooses its approach towards the population,  armed
groups,  and the  international  community.  According to  the  “power ideology trade-off”  and the
“extremist discount”  (Keister et al. 2014: 13-16) armed militias decide if sacrificing ideology to
gain compliance and align with the international community, or if exerting violence challenging the
practices advocated by the UN. The latter is pivotal because it assesses the self-determination claim
and it weights the actor’s strategy as well as its commitment to democratic practices of governance. 
Understanding how the “power ideology trade-off” and the “extremist discount” influenced the
self-determination implied the same analysis for two chapters. Using the same criteria, I argue that
is possible to compare the strategies enacted by ISIS and Hezbollah, always considering how much
their  different  regional  and  political  contexts  affected  the  creation  of  these  armed militias  and
facilitated or not the self-determination. Thus, retracing their approaches can further shed light on
what reasons led Baghdadi to declare the Islamic State, and what led Hezbollah to be incorporated
into the state’s structure. 
Firstly, the historical context proved how the Iraqi/Syrian and Lebanese social fabrics were
dismantled  by  the  international  influence  and  the  immobility  of  the  Arab  states  in  generating
national cohesion. The succession of weak and sectarian governments led to the failure to export the
Weberian-type of state theorized by the West, and consequently to confrontations for power and
authority.  In this context,  both ISIS and Hezbollah reinforced their  ranks exerting two different
types of pragmatism. For ISIS, the “fragility of the state structures in Iraq and Syria” as well as
“regional and global rivalries” were the keys for its surge (Gerges 2016: 49). I state that jihadists
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exerted the “extremist discount” taking advantage of this situation by infiltrating and exasperating
the sectarian divide within Iraq and Syria. Learning from multiple oppositions since its formation,
the group has grown in a context that favoured the rhetoric of jihad. The adoption of violence was
somewhat  justified  to  the  eyes  of  the  displaced  Sunnis  who  were  disempowered  by  Shiite
governments backed by part of the international community. Moreover, the actor profited from the
clash of interests between countries backing Assad and the ones backing the rebels in Syria. Even
when several states took the arms against the group, their scarce commitment to deploy a contingent
against the Islamic State ended up bolstering ISIS’s “narrative of invincibility”, allowing it to draw
more  recruits  than  ever  before  (Ibid.).  Oppositely,  Lebanon’s  context  was  characterized  by
Maronite’s domination which triggered the Muslim communities and especially the Shiite one, who
felt  persecuted  by  the  consensus  between  the  U.S.,  the  Christians,  and  Israel.  Instead  of
exasperating the situation, Hezbollah’s ideology became the mean to reject the confessional state
and  rather  create  a  “nationalist”  logic.  Although  the  conflict  between  the  various  actors  was
favouring the sectarian divide, Hezbollah’s pragmatism lied in developing the logic of muqawāma
as  the need to  defend the Lebanese borders  as well  as  the totality  of  the Lebanese population
(Calculli 2018: 98). In this way, it has managed to act as a state entity whereas entering the state’s
institutions by sacrificing part of its ideology. This approach is mainly consistent with the “power
ideology trade-off”. 
Regarding  ideology,  ISIS’s  extremism  paved  the  way  for  the  self-determination,  whereas
Hezbollah has opted for a pragmatic approach.  ISIS has been clear on the steps to achieve the
caliphate by offering a strict interpretation of the Sharia and outlining the clarity of its ideological
and  strategic  message.  The  laws  of  the  Islamic  State  are  framed  within  the  Qu’ran and  the
interpretation of its Imams, whereas every action is justified by an ideological explanation that goes
back to seventh-century Arabia (Gerges 2016: 34-41). Moreover, the ways in which ISIS abandoned
al-Qaeda  Central’s  orbit  are  clear  examples  of  how the  “extremist  discount”  impacted  on  the
group’s leaders and the purge of opponents of the caliphate’s resurrection. I assert that ISIS rejects
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peaceful coexistence together with the rules of international society, and in doing so it aims to gain
legitimacy from the Sunnis who see in the caliphate the last guardian of their identity, a position that
reinforces the ideological cohesiveness of its ranks and erases the need to be integrated in any kind
of  system.  Conversely,  the  “Party  of  God”  has  been  created  as  a  rebel  movement,  indeed  a
movement of resistance, which uses religious ideology as a sort of shield against the confessional
Christian  state  backed  by  the  international  forces.  Religion  serves  as  the  counterpart  of  the
Christian-U.S.-backed  state  but  is  not  the  heart  of  Hezbollah’s  ideology.  Indeed,  although  the
aspiration  to  the  Islamic  State  is  mentioned  on  the  risala  al-maftuha,  the  group’s  elites  were
conscious of the vagueness of this  project,  whereas the references to religion were designed to
develop a sense of cohesion based on nationality rather than sect (Calculli 2018: 72). I assert that
the group’s pragmatism is in line with the “power ideology trade-off”, especially if one considers
the deposition of the first Secretary General of the group, Subhi al-Tufaiily, because of its extremist
vision of the Shia/Sunni divide and its project to develop the Islamic State. 
As I  have argued,  depending on the ideological  commitment,  the popular  will  is  managed
through coercion or service provision. On one hand, ISIS proved capable of using violence when it
came to govern and organize people. Although offering better services than the ones of the previous
governments, taxes’ collection has proved vital for the group which exerts punishments when the
zakat is not paid. Its ideological distance from the Iraqi/Syrian average civilian ultimately facilitated
the  “extremist discount”, the competition with democratic practices of the international community
and the massacres of innocent people. Furthermore, the scarce resonance of these acts within the
international debate reinforced the “invincibility” of ISIS and allowed it to change the political
culture of its territories prioritizing “warfare over welfare” (Gerges 2016: 280). The Islamic State
linked its interests with that of agrarian and tribal elements by empowering Sunnis living in rural
areas and building a power base that reinforces its uncompromising dialectic. On the other hand,
entering politics allowed Hezbollah’s governance to be based on welfare provision and inclusion
affected by the “power ideology trade-off”. Providing more efficient services than the Lebanese
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Government’s ones, Hezbollah showed its willingness to face social problems as well as to sideline
its Shiite identity by adopting a welfare system that provides support to every religious community,
especially in southern Lebanon. As ISIS did, Hezbollah has built a strong power base by showing
the state weaknesses from a legitimate position, although with a different approach given by the
sacrifice  of  its  ideology.  I  claim  that  this  approach  is  significantly  in  line  with  the  practices
advocated by the international community, and given that it is built on the inclusion of different
sects, it makes the return to the Islamic State highly dangerous for the group’s resilience. 
The analysis of the group’s relationships with other militias supported an inner understanding
of the reasons for declaring, or not, territorial sovereignty. The clash for power in Syria indicated an
ideological  and political  divide between ISIS’s  project  and that  of its  “parent” organization al-
Qaeda, bolstered by the death of bin Laden. Moreover, al-Nusra’s unexpected surge proved that
ISIS feared to lose its authority and the chances to expand the caliphate. The bridge between al-
Nusra and al-Qaeda represented a menace to ISIS’s integrity and legitimacy, that tried to re-knit its
ranks  by  stating  that  al-Nusra  was  an  extension  of  ISI  in  Syria.  Consequently,  Joulani’s  and
Zawahiri’s positions stood for the incompatibility of ISIS’s extremism with their slower project of
reinforcement. I support that for Baghdadi the declaration of the Islamic State was a way to reify the
group’s  status quo,  taking the control of the jihadist global movement and replacing Zawahiri’s
leadership, showing even more that the conflict between al-Qaeda and al-Nusra was philosophical
and ideological and not just a power-struggle for territory and authority (Adnani 2014: 1). On the
contrary,  the  Lebanese  political  landscape  gave  Hezbollah  the  conditions  to  prove  capable  of
intertwining a relationship with the LAF by continuously re-framing its projects. The need to get
stronger when the international forces were threatening its resilience, led the group to enter the
government and develop the logic of resistance by linking its interests with that of the Lebanese
army as well as the intelligence. Hezbollah exported the muqawāma as the necessity to defend the
Lebanese  population  and  the  country’s  borders  by  renouncing  to  the  first  concept  of  jihad,
legitimizing itself and adopting traits typical of the state without being recognized as such. When
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the group allied with Michel Aoun, it proved capable of going beyond the sectarian divide and
convinced part  of  the  LAF about  the  legitimacy of  its  project.  Entering  politics  represented  a
socialization of the armed group inside the institutional and regulatory system (Dionigi in Calculli
2018: 94), preventing the party's enemies from hampering the movement. Thus, when Hezbollah
obtained a  trans-confessional  constituency,  the  pursuit  of  the  Islamic  State  might  have become
undesirable. 
Finally,  the  relationship  with  the  international  community  is  the  last  relevant  category  in
understanding the self-determination. As I have mentioned, the total war waged by the Islamic State
refers to the “near enemy”. However, the group exerted violence outside of its borders by absorbing
the logic of the “far enemy” typical of al-Qaeda. The attacks on Western soil have been perceived as
a  strategy  to  divert  the  attention  of  military  and  strategic  losses.  Nevertheless,  this  outreach
campaign indicates that ISIS reinforces its worldwide constituency by challenging the international
community, attacking powerful countries while bringing terror to the heart of Europe and the U.S.
(Gerges  2016:  46).  Indeed,  ISIS  reinforced  its  appeal  towards  displaced  Sunnis  and  wannabe
jihadists throughout the world, entering the international scenario by affecting the agendas of many
countries. I argue that pursuing the “extremist discount”, in a context crafted by wars and power
struggles, is for ISIS a way to display its capability of gaining international personality by virtue of
the menace it poses. Thus, the self-determination is meant to gain trust from the power base and to
recruit  thousands of  potential  militants  and skilled professionals  who believe in  ISIS’s  project.
Regarding Hezbollah, the group has always been involved in countering the American and Israeli
influence over Lebanon. Nevertheless, profiting from the Syrian Civil War, Hezbollah incorporated
the dialectics of the war on terror and the state’s sovereignty. By connecting the logic of resistance
with  the  defence  of  the  confessional  pluralism  of  Lebanon,  the  group  proved  capable  of
incorporating the traits advocated and assessed by the international community (Calculli 2018: 137-
139). In this respect, Hezbollah managed to be perceived as a regular force rather than a violent
militia,  tacitly  showing  that  the  pursuit  of  the  Islamic  State  was  sidelined  in  its  political  and
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ideological project. The actor also profited from the terrorist attacks on Western soil in 2015 by
addressing  the  takfiris as  the  main  menace  to  counter,  showing  closeness  to  Christians  and
reinforcing its logic of inclusiveness (Ibid.). I state that the “power ideology trade-off”, affected by
the particular historical and socio-political contexts of Lebanon and Syria, provided the “Party of
God” with the means for being legitimized both to the eyes of the state and several members of the
international community. 
Understanding the conditions to claim or not territorial sovereignty implied a deep case-study
analysis that has shown how ISIS’s and Hezbollah’s approaches are guided by different variables,
respectively  the  historical/political  context  of  their  countries  as  well  as  their  ideologies.  The
creation of Baghdadi’s  caliphate  occurred at  a moment when the Arab state system was facing
internal and external trials. The pragmatism of ISIS’s leadership lied in exasperation of the sectarian
divide within the already torn Iraq and Syria and in the creation of an image that provided a large
constituency  composed  by  displaced  Sunnis  worldwide  (Ibid.:  228).  ISIS  rejects  any  peaceful
coexistence and the norms of the international community by resorting to violence and avoiding
compromises, seeking legitimation within its power base and especially rural and abandoned areas,
using religion as the tool to maintain power. Othman bin Abdel Rahman al-Tamini, one of ISIS’s
ideological theorists, stated that this military and political control facilitated the declaration of the
Islamic State because ISIS’s jihadists are better acquainted with the circumstances they found in
Iraq  and  Syria  by  eliminating  agency  and  popular  will  (al-Tamini  in  Gerges  2016:  216).  The
ideological clash with al-Nusra and al-Qaeda further paved the way for the self-determination. I
assert that by adopting the extremist approach, ISIS has united plenty of enemies against, whereas it
has rejected the “international”-state system by offering a revolutionary alternative that is based on
the Sunni Islamic Identity, not on the state sovereignty (Gerges 2016: 286). That is why ISIS is the
only  jihadist  group  to  have  declared  territorial  sovereignty.  Oppositely,  Hezbollah  faced  well
different  conditions  in  Lebanon.  The leadership’s  pragmatism lied  in  trading part  of  the  Shiite
identity and political agenda to develop a logic of resistance and inclusion adapting to the state’s
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role. Hezbollah contested and entered the fractures of the Christian government from a legitimate
position by adopting the rhetoric of power typical of the state while reinforcing its military wing
(O’Brien in Calculli  2018: 44).  The leverage on the defence of the Lebanese sovereignty gave
Hezbollah  the  possibility  to  negotiate  its  position  rather  than  imposing  it  through  the  self-
determination, building a status quo that balanced the ambiguity of a group that was moving from
the political realm to the armed one. In this context, I claim that the self-determination would have
had a negative value for the group’s stability, given that the Islamic identity was rather sacrificed to
construe the logic of resistance, profiting from the Lebanese socio-political context.  Eventually,
Hezbollah managed to be part of the state, achieving the complementarity between the state and the
non-state entity (Calculli 2018: 142). The legitimacy and the resilience then do not come from the
international  community,  but  rather  from  being  part  of  a  concept  (the  state)  that  is  already
sovereign. Beyond what is said about Hezbollah and its ideology, the group will always act more as
a rational (and political) actor rather than a religious one (Norton 1998: 147-158; Norton 1999: 1-
35),  floating  in  a  position  that  facilitates  the  “power  ideology  trade-off”  and  allows  the
reinforcement of its trans-confessional power base, besides erasing the need to be incorporated as a
state entity in the international system. 
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